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PUBLIC ORDER

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April 4th 2019 was the 70th anniversary since the foundation of the most powerful political-military organization so far, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which reunites 29 states in the Euro-Atlantic area, including Romania. During this period, due to the profound, sometimes unpredictable, changes, the Alliance had to continuously adjust its Strategic Concepts so as to be able to answer to the new challenges in the international arena. All these culminated with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. All the Member States promptly answered US request and cohesion measures were taken within the Alliance level meant to counter the terrorist phenomenon. 08:47, September 11th, 2001 can be considered „the time which changed the world”.

NATO is an alliance of nations including Romania, as of 2004, aiming at safeguarding freedom, common heritage and civilization of the peoples it represents, relying on principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. NATO Allies are committed to collective defense, ensuring freedoms, modernizing military capabilities, promoting citizens' safety and security. The Allies need to be strong and fully prepared so as NATO might be able to ensure peace and prosperity for another 70 years – and beyond.

US Embassy, 70 Years of NATO, 4th April 2019



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EDITORIAL

TIMES THAT CHANGE THE WORLD

Globalization, with all its consequences, be they good or bad, is urging us towards performing an X-ray scanning of national and international security environments, the interferences between them, the ways in which great powers / state or non-state actors understand that they cannot solve international problems on their own. The balance between the mild approach (economy, communication, diplomacy etc.) and the military approach is going to determine the direction and sense in which great international actors are heading during the 21st century. Which of these two types of measures is going to work, which transformations are going to take place and what will times look like?? These are only a few of the questions that the Journal of the Academy of National Security Sciences are trying to answer. Starting with the first issue of the Journal, the main subject presented was extended national security, including all its dimensions. We continue our endeavor with different points of view, some of which remarkably unexplored so far. For this, we are trying to comprehend the significance of power embraced by the new / the same actors, the great actors on the international stage.

The manner of resorting to power, especially in the case of developed countries, has actually acquired various shapes, each of the competitors trying to impress the others by oscillating between harshness and gentleness, between claims and mistrust, between caution and fear, all of them relying on political, economic, military dimensions used differently, in a certain hierarchy.

Is it true that the technology at the beginning of the century and the speedy globalization of information may trigger a fundamental change in the domain of economic power, especially the military one? May this cause greater or smaller threats made by non-state actors? What kind of consequences would those threats have? Here are some questions which find



possible answers in the pages written by our authors, justifying by their opinions expressed here the main directions of power diffusion and of the likely shape power is going to take in the information globalization age. The power held nowadays by certain states, the great actors, is based on (and sometimes is the same as) that of resources. The great actors (be they old or new) have to understand that the effects or results obtained through military power are limited and promoting human rights and freedoms, democracy and civil society cannot be performed solely through the power of bullets. Therefore, there is a need to become aware of and especially comprehend the complex tri-dimensional chess game as well as concepts such as single-polarity, bi-polarity, multi-polarity, omnipresence and omnidirectionality.

Information technology has completely changed the dimensions of conflicts; the action means to be used no longer take into account the diverging borders among states, permanence and permeability transform the idea of conflict and claims an intensification of concept development and consequences which are still hard to predict. We are discovering a world that is rapidly moving in unpredictable directions and is constantly adjusting to the environment through a process of reconsideration, redefinition and restructuring.

The profound changes produced have allowed the emergence of non-state powers (actors) or underground structures that led to a diversification of risks, threats, and hazards regarding extended national security. The members of the Academy of National Security Sciences are trying, through their research and approach, to depict an accurate image of the factors and trends manifested nowadays, of the multitude of disputes and conflicts humanity has to face. Security organizations are continuously re-structured and re-shaped. Europe is the core place hosting for centuries a confrontation among three empires and three religions, creating a complex geo-political, geo-economic, and geo-strategic context, with constantly changing parameters, determining a new configuration of power resources, relations, conceptual and especially operational models.

Romania's role, significance and destiny as a EU and NATO member state depends on the efficient manner in which we manage to identify and comprehend the attitude of the great power poles, the global issues and especially the capacity of harmonizing our own interests with theirs. In other words, our place should be in the same boat with the winners. Otherwise, any endeavor, whatever its nature, will remain a mere fruitless act.

Editorial Board



NATO AT 70 YEARS OF EXISTENCE: MYTHS AND / OR CONTROVERSIES REVEALED CONCERNING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

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***Abstract:** Both the Alliance (NATO) and Russia, as the successor to the USSR, were challenged to realize that there was no way to return to the old relationships of decades of confrontation, but a historic necessity to find a form of coexistence in the new security environment.*

Therefore, in those circumstances, the only solution was to build a new relationship starting from the existing state and looking onto the future with confidence instead of making analyses of the past.

Regarding the NATO-Russia relationship, there have been a number of controversies and even some myths were born that were eventually clarified or even debunked by NATO transparency.

NATO is far from seeking a confrontation with Russia, but it is rather interested in the establishment and maintenance of stable relations in ways that foster an adequate level of trust and transparency.











Keywords: NATO, Russia, cooperation, partnership, security, myths, claims.

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political-military alliance formed in 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington (April 4, 1949).

At present, NATO comprises 29 states in Europe and North America with the prospect to accept yet another member in the near future (North Macedonia).

The accession of the 29 member countries in NATO took place in seven stages: In 1949, 12 countries were accepted as founding members:

 Belgium;  Canada;  Denmark;  United States;  France;
 Iceland;  Italy;  Luxembourg;  Norway;  Netherlands;



Portugal; UK; în 1952 : Greece; Turkey; In 1955: Germany; In 1982: Spain; în 1999: Hungary; Poland; Czech Republic; în 2004: Bulgaria; Slovakia; Slovenia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Romania; în 2009: Croatia; Albania; în 2017: Montenegro.

The Warsaw Pact or **the Warsaw Treaty**, officially called the **“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”**, was initiated by Nikita Khrushchev and was signed in Warsaw on May 14th, 1955. This pact was concluded as a military alliance of the “Eastern European countries” and the “Eastern Bloc”, as a reply to the creation of the NATO alliance, included 8 states and was dissolved at the Prague meeting on 1st July 1991.

The eight states became members of the Warsaw Treaty in 1955 as follows: Members of the Warsaw Treaty (8) during 1955-1968 Albanian People's Republic; 1955-1991: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; The Polish People's Republic; The German Democratic Republic; **Romanian People's Republic / Socialist Republic of Romania**; The Hungarian People's Republic; The People's Republic of Bulgaria; Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

On the emblem of the **Warsaw Pact** there was a motto: Союз Мира и Социализма (Soyuz Myra and Socialism), which meant the Union of Peace and Socialism.

The Pact ceased to exist on 3rd March 1991 and was formally dissolved at the meeting in Prague on 1st July 1991.

Several special events marked the world at that time, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, along with the change in NATO's policy of dealing with formerly irreconcilable enemies.

When the NATO Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949 by the twelve founding allies, President Truman said that its members *“wanted not only to establish freedom, release the North Atlantic community of aggression and the use of force, but also to actively seek to promote and maintain peace throughout the world”*¹.

¹ <https://ro.usembassy.gov/nato-70th-anniversary/>.



The great challenge for both the Alliance (NATO) and Russia as the successor to the USSR was to realize that there was no way to return to the old relationships in decades of confrontation, but a historical necessity to find a way to co-exist in the new environment security. Therefore, in those circumstances, the only solution was to build a new relationship starting from the existing situation and look towards the future with confidence instead of making analyses of the past.

NATO's operational leadership is represented by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and **NATO Chairman of the Military Committee** - Marshal Sir Stuart Peach.

NATO reacted to this changed security environment by strengthening its deterrence and defense position, while remaining open to dialogue. The Alliance did not seek confrontation and did not pose a threat to Russia. Jens Stoltenberg said, "*We do not want a new cold war with Russia*"².

US Ambassador to Romania Hans Klemm said on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of NATO's existence: "*NATO's strength lies in its unity and faith in the principles and purposes for which it was created. Our commitment to the collective defense of all NATO member states is unwavering, as well as our commitment to the shared values of democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law*"³.

This remained the collective aspiration of NATO Alliance members. In this spirit, NATO has played a historic role in peacekeeping and offers the same security today, even if the Alliance faces new threats.

For decades, NATO allies have stopped the expansion of communist dictatorships in Europe and have made sure that the horrors we have seen in the Second World War would never hit our nations again. After the Cold War, the Alliance adapted itself to the new circumstances, establishing partnerships with its opponents in the former Cold War and reacting to the Balkan conflict.

Romania, which had the chance to become a NATO member 15 years ago (on 29th March 2004), quickly proved to be a capable ally, and is

²DW's Zhanna Nemtsova interview NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; (DW=Deutsche Welle) [<https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-theinf-nuclear-treaty/a-4581536>].

³<https://ro.usembassy.gov/nato-70th-anniversary/>.



now one of the few allies to fulfill its commitment made in Wales. From this point on, the qualitative risk assessment acquires other values (see qualitative equation of the risk⁴).

The United States, through its Ambassador's authorized voice in Bucharest, positively appreciates Romania's attitude and assures the application of "collective defense" provisions to Romania, too: *"The United States and other NATO allies have worked continuously to ensure the security of Romania and the Eastern flank of the Alliance. Together we will work to address the new challenges, including military, cyber and hybrid threats"*⁵.

In the same note of realism, concern and accountability, it is considered that NATO is not looking for confrontation, but it also favors collaborating with other countries to avoid conflict. *"However, instead of working with us to address the new challenges, Russia demonstrates the aggression that threatens to erode the prosperity, stability and peace that we have built over the last 70 years. Russia remains the biggest threat to the sovereignty and independence of the individual European national states and the common values that link the West"*⁶.

Myths and/or controversies revealed concerning NATO-Russia relationship

We are going to render below a top of the most significant myths and/or controversies that have come up within NATO-Russia relationship and which have been revealed and explained by both sides, by the two world actors involved.

We believe it is significant for the subject of this article to analyze some of the *"hottest"* issues (claims, demands) raised by the Russian side and the presentation of the actual state of facts by NATO's highest representative.

The Press Conference held by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 25th,

⁴ G. Boaru, M. Răducu, V. Păun, Managementul riscurilor în acțiunile militare, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2003, pp. 19-21.

⁵ <https://ro.usembassy.gov/nato-70th-anniversary/>.

⁶ *Ibidem*.



2019 highlights NATO's official stance and responses to a series of controversies in the relations between the two sides (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Jens Stoltenberg - January 25, 2019.

Myth 1: NATO's presence in the Baltic region is dangerous

As part of the Alliance's commitment to transparency, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania hosted Russian arms control inspectors in November 2017 (Figure 2) and March 2018. They visited a number of military sites, including some of the multinational military combat groups.



Figure 2. NATO staff meets Russian Arms Control Inspectors at Infantry Brigade 1 in Estonia at Tapa on November 8, 2017.



Myth 2: NATO surrounds Russia

This myth ignores geography. Russia's land border is over 20,000 kilometers long. Of these, less than the sixteenth part (1,215 kilometers) is shared with NATO members. Russia has land borders with 14 countries. Only five of them are NATO members.

Outside NATO territory, the Alliance only has military presence in two places: Kosovo and Afghanistan. Both operations are conducted with the United Nations mandate, approved by the UN Security Council, whose Member State is also Russia. On the other hand, Russia has soldiers and military bases in three countries - Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - without the consent of the governments.

Myth 3: NATO tried to isolate or marginalize Russia

For more than two decades, NATO has been working constantly to build a cooperative relationship with Russia.

NATO began a dialogue rather than confrontation at the NATO Summit in London in July 1990. In the years to come, the Alliance promoted dialogue and cooperation through the setting of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), open to the whole of Europe, including Russia.

In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, creating the Joint NATO Russia Permanent Council. In 2002, it was upgraded, creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

We wanted to build a good relationship with Russia. We have worked together on issues ranging from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism actions to measures meant to rescue submarines and civil emergency planning.

However, in March 2014, in response to Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, NATO opened channels of communication with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council met seven times since April 2016. The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General also regularly engage with their Russian counterparts. *"We are not looking for confrontations, but we cannot ignore Russia violating international rules"*.



Myth 4: NATO promised Russia that it will not expand after the cold war

NATO's open-door policy is based on Article 10 of the Alliance's core document, the North Atlantic Treaty (1949). The treaty states that NATO membership is open to any *“European state able to continue the principles of this treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”*. It states that any decision on enlargement should be made *“with unanimous agreement”*. NATO has never revoked Article 10 nor limited its enlargement potential. Over the past 65 years, 29 countries have freely chosen, also in accordance with their domestic democratic processes, to join NATO. This was their sovereign choice.

In addition, at the time of the pledge, the Warsaw Pact still existed. Its members disagreed with its dissolution until 1991. The idea of their accession to NATO was not on the agenda in 1989. This was confirmed by Mikhail Gorbachev himself in an interview with *“Russia Beyond Headlines”*: The “subject” of NATO expansion *“had not been discussed at all and was not even brought up during those years. I can say this with all responsibility. No country in Eastern Europe raised this issue, even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Nor did the Western leaders raise it”*.

In addition, the declassified White House transcripts also reveal that in 1997 Bill Clinton constantly refused Boris Yeltsin's offer of a *“gentleman's agreement”* that no former Soviet republic would enter NATO: *“I cannot make commitments on behalf of NATO, I will not be in a position to vote NATO enlargement to any country, and even less allow you or anyone else to do this... NATO operates by consensus”*.

Myth 5: NATO anti-missile defense threatens Russian security

The NATO missile defense system is purely defensive and not directed against Russia. Bilateral agreements between the United States and host nations do not allow rocket sites to be used for purposes other than missile defense.

The system protects against ballistic missiles outside the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO has often tried to cooperate with Russia in the field of missile defense. Russian statements threatening to target allies due to NATO missile defense are unacceptable and counterproductive.



The NATO Secretary General's answers and / or explanations are extremely open and clear about the five "myths" I have presented in this article. At the same time, the controversies and tensions in NATO-Russia relations continue on a different scale, and are always fueled by current political-military events. Examples in these regards are the latest statements and / or declarations made by the President of the Russian Federation in the first months of 2019.

Extract from **Vladimir Putin's speech** at the Russian Federal Assembly (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Moscow (Russia), February 20, 2019.

*"By using mid-range target missiles, and installing launchers in Romania and Poland, which are suitable for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, the US openly violated these Treaty clauses. They did it some time ago. These launchers are already stationed in Romania and nothing is happening. Nothing seems to be happening. That is really weird. It is not completely alien to us, but people should be able to see and understand"*⁷.

In the same speech accusing NATO, held at the Federal Russian Assembly in 20th February 2019, Vladimir Putin stated his unfounded concern for international security:

⁷ Feb 20, 2019 ... *Vladimir Putin Address to Russian Federal Assembly. by Vladimir Putin.* [<https://www.voltairenet.org/article205285.html>].



“Russia does not claim to be the first to have placed these missiles in Europe. If they are indeed built and installed on the European continent, and the United States intends to do so, at least we will not hear the contrary, this will dramatically enhance the situation of international security, and will create a serious threat to Russia as some missiles can reach Moscow in just 10-12 minutes. This is a very dangerous threat to us. In this case, we will be forced, I would like to point out that we will be forced to respond with identical or asymmetric actions. What does this mean?”⁸

Zircon and Avangard: Putin’s latest message to American intelligence⁹

In his latest address in front of the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin seems to be eager to change the Zircon Hypersonic Rocket (Figure 4) before the Avangard systems became operational. This would put Russia in a position of superiority over the US.



Figure 4. Zircon Hypersonic Rocket

The Zircon hypersonic missile, along with the Avangard system, was mentioned by President Vladimir Putin in his speech on February 20, 2019, in which he further remarked that *“if the US places mid-range missiles in Europe, Russia will target not only launching facilities but also their command centers. Some of them being on the American continent.”*

⁸ Feb 20, 2019 ... Vladimir Putin Address to Russian Federal Assembly. by Vladimir Putin. [<https://www.voltairenet.org/article205285.html>].

⁹ [<https://www.voltairenet.org/article205309.html>].



Russia Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)

The unilateral withdrawal of the US from the INF is the most urgent and most discussed issue in Russian-American relations.

The only weapon that could hit the US, from Russia, for which the US has no antidote, is Avangard. Yet, it will be only at the end of 2019 that Russia will have only two Avangard systems in combat service. Instead, Zirkon has huge potential for modernization and adaptation, which the US fears the most. It is assumed that a Zirkon with increased radius becomes a smaller Avangard that has the ability to hit the US territory.

It seems President Putin would like to convey to the Americans that Zirkon, with its huge speed, could become the US nightmare, as a result of the unilateral exit of the US from the INF.

Conclusions

For reasons of security and continental stability, the cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial for both Russia and NATO.

This cooperation may be directed to:

- establishing and maintaining stable relationships in ways that foster an adequate level of trust and transparency;
- establishing the principle of joint responsibility for joint decisions in areas of mutual interest, based on consensus;
- applying the benefits of Russia-NATO interoperability to the activities of other organizations and institutions such as the EC, OSCE, UN, as well as in bilateral relations;
- using these measures to increase Russia's and NATO's ability to jointly counter threats outside Europe.



Will it be possible again???
(Figure 5).

Figure 5. Cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial.



The commitment regarding collective defense of our shared values and the sovereignty of NATO member states are the reasons why the Allies decided in 2014 to increase investment in our national defense.

NATO has pledged to spend at least two percent of defense GDP and to invest at least 20% of these spending for major equipment by 2024.

As Romania's national defense investments intensify, Romania, at its 15th anniversary of NATO membership, will help NATO make sure that in the Romanian Armed Forces, all the services are prepared, equipped and ready for action when called upon, in crisis or conflict situations, against any threat.

Romania will strengthen its capacity to address hybrid threats. We are also assured that NATO can increase its resources to support our partners in combating terrorism, building stability in crisis-prone areas, and reducing the likelihood of terrorist attacks on allied territories.

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ROMANIA - A NATO MEMBER STATE VITAL TO ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH-EAST FLANK OF EUROPE

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Motto:

*“Romania is our homeland and of all
Romanians. It is the Romania of those from long ago
and those from far into the future. It is the country of the
people who have gone and of the people who are going
to be born.”*

Barbu Ștefănescu Delavrancea

Abstract: *On 29 March 2004, Romania submitted the instruments of ratification at the State Department of the United States of America, the main state of the Treaty of the North Atlantic Alliance.*

The present year we have celebrated the 15th anniversary since Romania became a member of NATO, but it has also been 70 years since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (April 1949), being the oldest military alliance.

Since its inception, the Alliance has worked to establish a fair order and lasting peace in Europe, based on the common values of human rights democracy, and in accordance with the rule of law.

When NATO started extending to the East, Romania, already oriented towards the West, strengthened the Atlantic Area Regional course.

In March of 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, Romania launched “a warning signal” that an imminent war is at its borders.

Romania felt threatened by the Russian Federation and saw the need to better secure its border and increase military security. The region suddenly focused on the fact that NATO, the United States and the EU realized the importance of strengthening



Romania to create a fortified Eastern flank to be able to stand up to an increasingly aggressive Russian Federation.

Keywords: Romania, NATO, Russian Federation, Europe, European Union, military security

Introduction

When Romania and other Eastern countries joined NATO in 2004, many were concerned about this expansion of the organization. It seemed pointless since the Cold War had ended and it did not appear when these countries had much to offer NATO. However, despite the initial and even current NATO enlargement, Romania has become a primordial member. This may seem like a major claim, especially for those who know very little about Romania, beyond the beliefs regarding a horrific communist regime or myths about castles and Count Dracula.

Since its accession and even before, Romania has been a NATO partner, which has contributed to various missions in Europe and the Middle East (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.).

Still, Romania remained aside until the year 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

Looking at the Black Sea map (Fig. No. 1), the geostrategic position of Romania becomes clear. However, this is a two-edged sword, because its proximity to Crimea increases the Romanian fear of aggression of the Russian Federation moving rapidly to the West. Constanța, Romania's main port to the Black Sea, is only 244 miles from Sevastopol—shorter than the distance between Madrid and Barcelona.



Figure No. 1. The Black Sea¹

¹<https://www.britannica.com/place/Black-Sea>, accessed on 15 April 2019.



Therefore, it is not surprising that Romania “*raised a red flag*” when the Russian Federation annexed the Crimea peninsula in March 2014.

Thus, Romania felt significantly threatened and saw the need to better secure the border and increase its military security.

At the same time, NATO, the United States and the EU saw the importance of strengthening Romania to create a fortified Eastern flank of Europe and of the Alliance.

A researcher said, “*If in the eighteenth century, Tsarina Catherine The Great changed the games in the Black Sea area, by annexing Crimea, in 2014 the Russian Federation and the annexation of Crimea was a change in the game not only for the largest region, the Black Sea, but for the entire global security system*”².

Since then, NATO has, “*in response to the security situation in its immediate vicinity, initiated a comprehensive process to adapt its defense position*”³.

A study in the year 2015 showed that “*the Russian Federation would defeat NATO forces in three days, so that an immediate increase in NATO’s Eastern deterrent position was clearly necessary*”⁴.

In addition, NATO remains concerned about other threats outside the Euro-Atlantic area, such as Iran and China. More and more, other nations realize that “*Romania - a crucial member state of NATO along the South-East flank of the Alliance, emerged as a regional leader, seeking ways to strengthen collective defense in and around the Black Sea*”⁵.

Romania is now essential to NATO’s future through its commitment to NATO, the evolution of military security and its geostrategic importance with the Russian Federation.

² Gosu, A. – “The Seizure of Crimea - A Game Changer for the Black Sea Region” (2015). *Journal on Baltic Security* 1 (1): 37-37-46.

³ <https://nato.mae.ro/en> - “Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO”, Romania - NATO (2010), accessed on 15 April 2019.

⁴ <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/03/if-russia-started-a-war-in-the-baltics-nato-would-lose-quickly> - De Luce, D. (2016, February 3), - “If Russia Started a War in the Baltics, NATO Would Lose - Quickly”. *Foreign Policy*, accessed on 15 April 2019.

⁵ <https://www.heritage.org/europe/event/20-years-after-the-relevance-the-romania-us-strategic-partnership-the-current>, “20 Years After: The Relevance of the Romania-U.S. Strategic Partnership in the Current International and Security Context (2018). *The Heritage Foundation*”, accessed on 15 April 2019.



Situation

Critics argue that NATO has led its course, but “*a strong alliance of NATO is the main column of European security*”⁶.

At the moment, NATO is focusing its attention on the aggressiveness of the Russian Federation, as Bugajski says: “*Two basic challenges emanate from Russia: expansion and implosion*”⁷.

If we are to look back to a period a few years ago, we will see that NATO was committed to ensuring the security of member countries with access to the Black Sea exit, but the security provided was weak. Yet, since 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and it became increasingly aggressive, NATO has put greater emphasis on “*increasing the security of NATO member countries with Black Sea output*”⁸.

Since the year 2004, since Romania became a NATO member, this issue of ensuring the security of NATO member countries riparian to the Black Sea has just begun to be taken into account.

Many researchers analyze Romania’s importance in the Alliance by grouping it with other states, such as: Bulgaria or Poland, but there is little research based on data reported on the importance of Romania for NATO, taken individually.

At the NATO summit in Warsaw, Romania was the one that drew attention to the concentration of the main effort on NATO member countries with Black Sea access, to ensure “*security in front of an increasingly aggressive Russian Federation*”⁹.

Thus, the Black Sea came to be regarded as the main subject on the agenda of NATO member countries, only after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014.

Romania became an important pillar ensuring NATO’s security in the region, having not only the geostrategic location, but also the courage to call to action in the region and to make real progress in the security of Eastern Europe.

⁶ Bugajski, J. – “Only NATO Can Defend Europe” (2016), *European View*, 15(1), 27-35.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/black-sea-a-pressure-point-between-nato-and-russia>, Nordenman, M. - (2017, March 8), „*Black Sea: A Pressure Point Between NATO and Russia. The Cipher Brief*”, accessed on 15 April 2019.

⁹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_132023.htm, accessed on 16 April 2019.



The commitment to NATO

Romania is essential to NATO because of its firm commitment to the organization.

Unlike the other NATO allies in Eastern Europe, “*Romania remained constant in its Pro-Atlantic foreign policy and a very close ally of the United States, while Bulgaria and Turkey have undergone smaller or greater changes in their policies towards NATO*”¹⁰.

Since the establishment of a strategic partnership with the US, nine years before becoming a NATO member, Romania focused on improving its military security and enhancing regional security. Romania’s commitment is certain, because action is really needed.

For example, after 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Romania hosted a meeting in Bucharest, consisting of nine states in NATO’s Eastern flank: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary.

Romania’s foreign minister (2016) said after this meeting: “*the fact that Romania is hosting this meeting is a reconfirmation of the role of our country at regional and NATO level*”¹¹.

In addition, starting with the year 2016, Romania would add special operations and cyber war commands to its defense system. All these came as a reaction to the actions of the Russian Federation regarding the annexation of Crimea and the military support of the Pro-Russians in Eastern Ukraine.

One of the most obvious signs of commitment to NATO is also the nations’ contribution in money. All members pledged to allocate 2% of their GDP to defense spending, but only the US, Greece, Estonia, the UK and Poland fulfilled this obligation. In the year 2017 Romania became the sixth nation to allocate 2% of its GDP to defense spending and set the premises to do so again for the next 10 years, recognizing its contribution as an integral

¹⁰<https://www.dw.com/ro/summit-nato-bucure%C5%9Fti-2-4-aprilie-2008/a-3227681>, accessed on 16 April 2019.

¹¹<http://www.nineoclock.ro/foreign-ministers-of-nine-allied-states-of-the-eastern-flank-nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-meet-in-bucharest-to-discuss-security-in-the-region>, Foreign Ministers of Nine Allied States of the Eastern Flank, NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller Meet in Bucharest to Discuss Security in the Region, (2016, November 8), Nineoclock, accessed on 16 April 2019.



way of demonstrating its support for NATO. This helped Romania acquire credibility within NATO and gave it the advantage of determining regional security support. Many have praised the nation for accession to this end, such as NATO secretary general, who said, “Romania is an example, helping to provide the alliance with the capacities we need and ensuring the fair sharing of missions”¹².

The US president, D. Trump repeatedly highlighted the need for every NATO member to contribute with its fair share and praised Romania.

The percentage of Romanian contribution to defense costs, alongside the other NATO member countries (Fig. No. 2), is the promised one.




Figure No. 2. The GDP contribution graph of each NATO member state¹³

This graph presents contributions to the defense spending of NATO member states, emphasizing the fact that Romania is a member of a number of “top countries” that fulfill their commitment to spending the necessary money for the collective defense of the countries within the Alliance.

Romania’s most important role in NATO is that of “spearhead” in the Black Sea region and fortress on the Eastern flank, but it must not be forgotten that our country has made significant contributions to other NATO missions as well.

¹² https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/news_147693.htm, Secretary General meets with Romanian President and Prime Minister, visits NATO Troops. (2017, October). *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, accessed on 17 April 2019.

¹³ https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170629_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf, accessed on 17 April 2019.



Romania is part of the group of countries that have been completing NATO missions in Afghanistan since the beginning. Romania wishes to encourage the stability of states, such as Afghanistan and realizes that *“Euro-Atlantic and international security is linked to the stability of Central and South Asia”*¹⁴.

It also participated in the arms embargo against Libya, sending nearly 200 troops¹⁵.

Moreover, Romania contributed to operations such as the presence in Georgia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the EU mission in Bosnia, the missions in Iraq and many others¹⁶.

This enumeration of instances of dynamic participation shows that Romania is an active NATO member eager to participate in various missions and to offer everything it can, in support of its partners in the alliance, even when the missions are not related to the regional security of Romania.

Increasing internal military security

Romania hosts a variety of significant military bases, including a ballistic missile base for defense, a multinational brigade, the headquarters of the NATO multinational division in the Southeast, a unit for integrating NATO forces (NFIU).

Also, Romania constantly participates in various land and naval exercises and many more, becoming one of Europe’s best-defended countries.

Romania’s determination to improve its military security in collaboration with NATO projects makes it a valuable, self-motivated partner.

These recent developments are significant because, *“in addition to increasing funding, European Allies also need to pursue military modernization and become able to defend all NATO borders”*¹⁷.

¹⁴ <https://nato.mae.ro/en>, Romania - NATO (2010). , *“Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO”*, accessed on 17 April 2019.

¹⁵ <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-joins-nato-arms-embargo-on-libya>, Chiriac, Marian (2011, March). Romania Joins NATO Embargo on Libya. *“Balkan Insight”*, accessed on 17 April 2019.

¹⁶ <https://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/docs/090401-romania.pdf>, *“Romania’s Contribution to Operations. NATO”*, (2009), accessed on 17 April 2019.

¹⁷ Bugajski, J. – *“Only NATO Can Defend Europe”* (2016), *European View*, 15(1), 27-35.



Romania's military modernization increases not only the security of its borders, but also the Eastern flank of NATO. In 2015, Romania completed The Ballistic Missile Defense Program of \$800 billion at Deveselu, a shore-based Aegis ballistic system, which is an integral part of NATO security.

Although the Russian Federation criticized it, considering it an offensive measure, NATO officials continue to insist that *"the defense system does not concern Russia. They referenced the Iranian missile program"*¹⁸.

Another Romanian military base, Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Air Base, has become a staging area for the efforts in Iraq¹⁹.

Implemented in 2015, the headquarters of the South-East Multinational Division (HQ MND-SE), now hosted in Bucharest, controls NATO's operations in the region and improves NATO's tailored presence²⁰. (Headquarters, 2017).

It cooperates with the integration unit of NATO forces, founded in Romania in 2015, and improves NATO's capacity for rapid mobilization of defense in the Black Sea region (NFIU, ND). Romania also hosts various joint military exercises aimed at training forces and increasing the level of deterrence of the Russian Federation in the region. For example, in 2017, Romania hosted the *"Saber Guardian"* exercise, led by the US Army, involving over 25,000 soldiers.

This year too, in 2019, there will be another *"Saber Guardian"* exercise led by the US army, but with much greater participation.

Romania's renewed commitment to meeting the 2% target of NATO spending led to major increases in military acquisitions.

Romania's status as the fastest growing economy in the EU makes it increasingly attractive for foreign investment²¹.

¹⁸ <http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/VP/2014/GeopoliticalImplicationsVP220616.pdf>, Upadhyay, D.K. (2016, June 22). "Geopolitical Implications of Missile Defense System in Europe". *Indian Council of World Affairs*, accessed on 18 April 2019.

¹⁹ <http://www.eur.army.mil/21tsc/MKAB/about.html>, Mikail Kogalniceanu Air Base Passenger Transit Center. (2018, February). *U.S. Army Europe*, accessed on 18 April 2019.

²⁰ <http://www.en.mndse.ro>, Headquarters Multi-National Division South-East. (2017). *NATO MNDSE*, accessed on 18 April 2019.

²¹ <https://www.politico.eu/article/central-and-eastern-eu-gdp-growth-economies>, Bayer, L. (2018, January 23), „Europe's Eastern Tigers Roar Ahead". *Politico EU*, accessed on 18 April 2019.



The Romanian Government made a high profile purchase from a U.S. company of missile defense systems, “Patriot”, valued at over \$3.9 billion²².

Romania is one of the first NATO members to receive this equipment, and this massive acquisition shows how serious Romania is about updating its military technologies.

At the beginning of 2018, the Romanian Army contracted \$1 billion to procure over 200 vehicles “Piranha 5”, huge wheeled armored vehicles, which will significantly modernize the Romanian Army²³.

They have recently been ranked as number 3 in the top of armored personnel carriers and only a few other countries have received them²⁴. In 2017 the Romanian Government also began to negotiate “the contract on the acquisition of the system of high-mobility artillery missiles (HIMARS)”²⁵.

The HIMARS system is currently operated almost exclusively by the US, and in 2018 “the Romanian Government approved the acquisition”²⁶ and requested over 50 of these launch rocket systems.

All these military acquisitions help Romania become a responsible nation with regard to its defense position and able to strengthen the defense of NATO’s eastern flank towards the increasingly aggressive Russian Federation.

²² <https://jamestown.org/program/romania-consolidates-defense-posture>, Visan, G. (2017, December). Romanian Consolidates its Defense Posture. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 14(159), accessed on 18 April 2019.

²³ <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/general-dynamics-awarded-1-billion-contract-to-deliver-piranha-5-wheeled-armored-vehicles-to-romanian-army-300581991.html>, “General Dynamics Awarded \$1 Billion Contract to Deliver PIRANHA 5 Wheeled Armored Vehicles to Romanian Army”. (2018, January 12). *Cision PRNewswire*, accessed on 18 April 2019.

²⁴ http://www.military-today.com/apc/top_10_armored_personnel_carriers.htm, “Top Ten Armored Personnel Carriers” (2017). *Military Today*, accessed on 18 April 2019.

²⁵ <https://jamestown.org/program/romania-consolidates-defense-posture>, Visan, G. (2017, December) - “Romanian Consolidates its Defense Posture”. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 14(159), accessed on 18 April 2019.

²⁶ https://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/romania_approves_purchase_of_us_m142_himars_missile/rocket_launchers.html, “Romania Approves Purchase of M142 HIMARS Missile/Rocket Launchers” (2018, February 17). *Army Recognition*, accessed on 18 April 2019.



The argument being the Russian Federation

A consistent amount of this military accumulation is due to fears of aggression coming from the Russian Federation.

Before 2004, Putin said that *“the Russian Federation had no concern about NATO’s expansion”*, adding that *“today’s threats are such that NATO’s expansion will not eliminate them”*²⁷.

Yet, from then until the present day, Putin has changed his tone. The Russian Federation argues that its aggression is purely defensive and is made in response to and as a justification for NATO enlargement.

Alexander Gruško, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, argues that *“Moscow strengthens its forces in the Black Sea area in the context of NATO’s infrastructure projects near Russia’s shores”*²⁸, according to the information on the website of *“TASS”* news agency, taken over by Mediafax.ro.

The Russian Federation will continue to monitor the infrastructure projects conducted by NATO in Romania and Bulgaria, as long as there are attempts by NATO states to create bases and to deploy additional forces there.

After *“the illegal annexation of Crimea”* there could be observed *“an accumulation of forces of the Russian army and a concentration of weapon systems, which changed the balance of forces that had existed until then”*²⁹.

It can be seen, every day, that *“the Russian Federation turned Crimea into a Russian military fortress, by the modernization of its Black Sea fleet and strengthening the Anti-Access/Denial zone capacities (A2/AD) in Crimea”*³⁰.

In recent times, the Russian Federation has tested several types of missiles, demonstrating that it has not only new missile capabilities, but also the desire to use them. Thus *“in October 2015, Moscow made the first*

²⁷La Guardia, A. – “NATO is No Problem in Baltics, Putin Tells the West” (2004, April 3), *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from Romania: Essential NATO Member 16.

²⁸https://www.realitatea.net/rusia-isi-consolideaza-fortele-in-zona-marii-negre-care-este-motivul_2188204.html, accessed on 19 April 2019.

²⁹https://www.dcnnews.ro/anexare-crimeea-teodor-mele-canu-acumulare-de-for-e-de-for-e-la-marea-neagra_561015.html, accessed on 19 April 2019.

³⁰<https://www.thecipherbrief.com/romania-modernizing-defense-capabilities>, Les, G.B. (2017, March 8) - „Romania: Modernizing Defense Capabilities”. *The Cipher Brief*, accessed on 19 April 2019.



operational use of SSN-30-A KALIBR, supersonic Sea-based cruise missiles... the new rocket has an estimated range of 620 to 923 miles, and can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads... The INF Treaty does not restrict the use of sea-based weapon systems, and an SSN-30 launched from the Northwest Black Sea could reach the German border”³¹.

The Russian military modernization at the Black Sea is increasing at an alarming rate, which makes Romania essential for deterring the Russian Federation.

Its geographic location means that Romania is in a vulnerable but strategic position. Although it was overlooked, *“the illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 brought back to international attention the strategic and geopolitical value of this region, once considered peripheral”³².*

Also, NATO Lieutenant General Broeks said that *“the region has become the focal point of Russia’s greater strategic ambitions and the revisionary agenda, making it a potential flashpoint for future conflicts over the NATO border”³³.*

Romania has its exit to the Black Sea and is disposed in front of the Crimea peninsula, where there is a great and very well defended Russian naval base (Sevastopol), and where the Russian Federation has concentrated many troops. So Romania is truly in the first line of defense of NATO and European Union borders.

The recent accumulation of forces of the Russian Federation at the Black Sea is undeniably a threat to Romania and thus to European security.

The refusal of the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops from the Crimea region/peninsula generates a state of uncertainty for the countries of Eastern Europe.

³¹http://www.afpc.org/files/defense_dossier_november_2015.pdf#page=13, Robbins, J.S. (2015, November). *“East European Missile Defense is Needed Now More than Ever. The American Foreign Policy Council Defense Dossier”*, 15, 11-14, accessed on 19 April 2019.

³² Naumescu, V. – *“Stability, Ambiguity and Change in the Discourses of NATO allies in the Black Sea region: The Cases of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey”* (2017). *Croatian International Relations Review*. 23(80): 187-209. doi:10.1515/cirr-2017-0025.

³³https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144.htm?selectedLocale=en, *“Director General of the NATO International Military Staff Addresses the Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum”*. (2017, June 13). NATO, accessed on 19 April 2019.



“The Russian Federation simply has an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea, and this aircraft carrier is the Crimea peninsula, which they have also packed with troops, missiles, anti-aircraft and air combat means”³⁴.

As a result of its geostrategic position and disputes of interest in the Black Sea area between NATO and the Russian Federation, Romania will become *“the zero point”* of world policy for the next years.

Romania’s strong feelings and fear of Russian aggression are strong motivators of the country to act quickly and take new defensive measures.

Romania does not waste time in strengthening its military security, because the threats of the Russian Federation around the Black Sea continue to grow.

As a result, Romania is a strong member that NATO can count on to be actively consistent in securing the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Romania is also important in terms of the Russian Federation and energy security.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentions that *“the Black Sea region is also the gateway for most of the oil and gas transported from the Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe. The security of the energy infrastructure that crosses this region is therefore essential for European energy security”³⁵.*

The European Policy Analysis Centre made the following argument that *“the energy security of Central and Eastern Europe has acquired a new emergency status since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis”³⁶.*

With respect to Romania, specialists from the European Policy Analysis Centre claim that *“Romania is in a somewhat privileged position, as it has its own energy resources and a strategic location at the point of passage between the East-West and North-South energy transit routes”³⁷.*

³⁴<https://www.digi24.ro/regional/digi24-oradea/traian-basescu-rusia-are-un-portavion-infipt-in-marea-neagra-peninsula-crimeea-ticsita-cu-trupe-si-rachete-1096745>, accessed on 20 April 2019.

³⁵https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Policy_paper_-_De_ce_conteaza_Marea_Neagra_-_NSC_-_iunie_2016-1.pdf, accessed on 20 April 2019.

³⁶ http://cepa.org/files/?id_plik=2090 Romania: Essential NATO Member 17, “Romania’s Energy Crossroads, Strategic Options for Improving Energy Security”. (2016). *Center for European Policy Analysis*, accessed on 20 April 2019.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.



Currently, Lukoil, a Russian company, provides a great deal of Europe's energy, including, for example, 100% of Bulgaria's oil imports.

This is a problem because the Russian Federation could reduce the supply of energy as leverage in a stand-off security. In addition, the European Union relies on Russian oil and could at any time be on the side of the Russian Federation, in a possible crisis, with all the economic sanctions imposed on it. In this period of unstable relations with the Russian Federation, Europe cannot afford to rely only on it for energy.

An EU energy dependency study found that *“EU member states most exposed to security of supply risks include the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, most of which heavily rely on pipelines in a single country, the Russian Federation, for their supply with oil”*³⁸.

Romania is the third country in the European Union to have the largest natural gas reserve, and it is probably that *“Romania can play a vital role as a gas supplier, contributing to the achievement of the EU's objectives of creating an energy union and a single market for gas and improving the energy security of its neighbors”*³⁹.

Despite the fact that Romania has a long way to go to make this possible, with reforms this can become a reality, especially with the help of neighboring countries. It has already signed an agreement to export billions of cubic meters of gas to Hungary in 2020.

Romania must make many changes in order to be truly successful in the energy sector, but has the potential to secure some of the energy security of European Union countries in the Black Sea area.

Conclusions

Romania's progress in recent years is truly evident.

After *“the illegal annexation of Crimea”*, Romania acquired a NATO regional leadership position and embraced the opportunity to modernize its army.

³⁸http://ier.ro/sites/default/files/pdf/SPOS_2016_Diplomatia_energetica_a_Uniunii_Europene.pdf, accessed on 20 April 2019.

³⁹<http://energypost.eu/romania-key-player-gas-eu>, Visensecu R., & Bartelet H. (2017, November 6), *“How Romania can Become a Key Player in the European Gas Market”*. *Energy Post EU*, accessed on 20 April 2019.



Other NATO regional members should seek in Romania an example of commitment to NATO as well as to improving military security and leadership in deterring the Russian threat.

By increasing its financial contributions to NATO, Romania has strengthened its position in the organization.

Romania has been extremely proactive in improving its military security, and this will help itself and NATO against the Russian threat in the years to come.

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6. *** <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-joins-nato-arms-embargo-on-libya>.
7. *** <https://www.britannica.com/place/Black-Sea>.
8. *** <https://www.dw.com/ro/summit-nato-bucure%C5%9Fti-2-4-aprilie-2008/a-3227681>.
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**THE POWER BALANCE EVOLUTION
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE BLACK SEA REGION**

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Abstract: *The threat to the regional and global balance of power is no longer solely caused by the increase in the power of another state, but rather by the role played by non-state actors - international terrorist organizations, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized cross-border crime. All of these elements are considered threats to national, regional and international security.*

In our opinion, this article is a pertinent analysis of the new threats to national security, as well as security in the geopolitical and geostrategic area of our country.

Keywords: *power; international relations; power balance; the Black Sea; state actors' relations; security.*

The balance of power is one of the fundamental concepts of realistic theory in the field of International Relations, in the sense that it has the role of governing and regulating relations between state entities that have sovereignty as their main characteristic. In his paper “Politics Between Nations,” Hans Morgenthau¹ affirmed that there is an organizational instrument for relations between states, and this is the balance of power that provides a relative order in the international arena, so that security in an anarchic world is assured, from a realistic perspective, by the balance of power, also called balance of force or balance of forces.

¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politica Între Națiuni*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2013, pp. 363-367.



The power balance is “*a state of things in which no power is in a preponderant position and cannot make the law for others*”². The balance of power paradigm is the most effective tool for representing the dynamics of the modern international system.

The idea of balance implies the need for balanced elements. In the absence of balance, an element will dominate the others, with potentially destructive consequences on the dominated elements. The goal of maintaining a power balance is to restore the stability of the system and the constituent elements of that system.

When we talk about the power balance, the phenomenon of counterbalance is not universal, it is bounded by the conditions of the goals, and it appears in response to the hegemonic threats. Thus, it is to be expected to find strong patterns of counterbalance, but not against any state that leads within the system, but only against those who pose hegemonic threats based on capabilities. Similarly, we should not expect to find powerful counterbalance patterns against the increase in the power of the strongest state in the system, but only against those who are already much stronger than other states. Higher power does not necessarily pose a threat to other great powers in the system, especially if the level of superiority is modest.

A key concept in the analysis of international relations between states, “power” is the ability of a state to influence another state, or to oppose the control that another state is trying to exert on it. This capacity is based on the existence and capitalization of some power resources, be they material or non-material.³ According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the power of a state consists of the following elements: geography, natural resources, population, national character, military training, national morale, industrial capacity, diplomacy, and governance⁴.

Hybrid threats are the opposing/hostile action of state and non-state actors that seek to create a favorable context and use, at a point of climax,

² Hedley Bull, *Societatea anarhică. Un studiu asupra ordinii în politica mondială*, Editura Știința, 1998, p. 93.

³ Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian (coord.), *Lumea 2011, Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii Strategice și de Securitate)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2011, pp. 19-23.

⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, pp. 151-188.



the conventional and less conventional means of enhancing the political, economic, diplomatic, cybernetic and information⁵ influence, so as to design and achieve the proposed targets.

Unlike the conventional approach to conventional conflicts, when we talk about hybrid threats, we realize that the means of conducting combat and non-combatant actions are combined within certain patterns of action, almost perfectly synchronized in time and space. All this leads to the utter possibility of the aggressive actor to be able to take action in the political, diplomatic and media environment in order to adopt a position by which he denies direct military involvement and clearly delimitates himself, positioning himself as neutral, at the same time displaying at international level an attitude of concern to the events he has just generated, following careful planning.

Decentralized planning and execution of actions in the event of a hybrid conflict allow combatants to have a very high degree of adaptability that classical structures based on a complicated chain of decision and command cannot afford but also lead to the impossibility of belonging to the opponent, command and liaison elements, making it even more difficult to counteract a hybrid threat.

The hybrid⁶ model involves the coordinated, open or undercover action of a broad spectrum of actions, including, but not limited to, military and civilian, conventional and unconventional means in an ambiguous attack on another state.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States of America were in the position of global superpowers, having the capacity to protect their global interests. This very bipolarity of the two superpowers was the dominant feature of the world order during the Cold War. Around these poles, states were grouped together, forming blocks of antagonistic power - the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty.

The conflicting relationship was representative for both the Eastern Socialist and the Democratic West, occupying the geopolitical scene of international relations⁷.

⁵ Usually of lower intensity than that of combat actions conducted with conventional means.

⁶ Used by Russia in Ukraine.

⁷ Gh. Balaban, *Securitatea și dreptul internațional: Provocări la început de secol XXI*, C.H. Beck, București, 2006, p. 50.



Together with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the bipolar world turned into a single pole of power, the US. Under the umbrella of NATO, the design of the economic and political force, of the military power seemed easy to achieve for the United States as soon as the enemy disappeared from the East, and the US strengthened its position quite easily. Yet, the relatively large distance to which the US tried to project its power to defend geopolitical and geostrategic interests was a costly factor. Most specialists in geopolitics indicate that the world entered a new era with multiple power centers.

The main power poles in the Extended Black Sea Region during the Cold War were the USSR and Turkey. The former Soviet Union imposed its centralized communist political leadership on all states in the area following the Warsaw Treaty. A NATO member in 1952, driven by the United States, Turkey, remained the only regional power, which, together with Greece, had the role of settling the balance of regional power.

According to the balance of threat theory developed by Stephen Walt, the alliances of a state are not meant to balance the growing power of another state actor, but to counterbalance the threat to its own security given by this increase in power⁸.

Thus, we analyzed the level of threat based on four factors: power, proximity, offensive ability, and offensive intentions. The first factor taken into account is power, the ability of a state actor to influence or control the behavior of the State concerned using the available power resources. Applying this factor from Walt's Theory to the Wider Black Sea Region, we identify the former Soviet Union in the position of the dominant power. It has ideologically and doctrinally coagulated all the Central and Eastern European states. The only states that have preserved their democratic leadership systems, also having Euro-Atlantic options, were Turkey and Greece.

After the dissolution of the former USSR, the balance of regional power changed both for the current Russian Federation and for the former states under socialist-communist political leadership. These geopolitical developments in the wider Black Sea region were of particular importance

⁸ Stephen M. Walt, *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*, în *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 4, Spring 1985, pp. 3-43, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540>, accessed on 18.11.2016.



to all major international and regional actors. The International Relations scene was shaken by the disintegration of the former Eastern giant. The consequences of this disintegration were the re-establishment of the former socialist republics in the new frontiers and the reorientation of most of the Central Eastern European states from Soviet politics to the Euro-Atlantic values of the European Union and NATO.

Proximity is the second factor used in order to balance the threat. This factor directly increases the level of threat to the reference state by the revisionist state whose power is growing. The ability of the latter to design its force varies inversely with the distance between the two states. The “sphere of influence” effect occurs when the weaker state chooses a submissive behavior. In this respect, case of the Extensive Black Sea Region and Eastern Europe during the Cold War can be considered representative.

If weaker states choose to balance the threat, then the alliances’ complex combination takes the form of a chessboard. In this case, small states are prone to become allies with remote powers, so that physical distance prevents the development of a security threat to weaker states by the allied power. The examples of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia in the post-Soviet era support this balancing behavior.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, after the political and ideological re-settlement and the re-definition of the Russian Federation’s economic and energy strategies, Walt’s power and proximity factors became paramount in the regional outline of the balance of power.

Another factor in Walt’s theory is the offensive capacity - the development of a state’s military power. By combining this factor with the previous one - geographical proximity, a temptation of embracing the ally’s position is identified, intensified precisely by the great physical distance between the threatened states and their allied power. This factor of the balance of threat theory developed by Walt was perfectly applied to the states of the former sphere of influence the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This tandem of factors can be considered less relevant in the current context of globalization, through technological development, military equipment development, and transport and communication systems.

In the Extensive Black Sea Region, the balance of power acts on two levels: the overall balance of power - referring to the geopolitical situation at the international level as part of a unitary system and the local balance of power - acting at lower levels.



The simple balance of power in the wider Black Sea Region is expressed by the power binomial relation between Russia and Turkey, and the complex balance of power is established between Russia - NATO - Turkey - the EU. By invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, the Russian Federation broke the simple balance of power in the region, but the balance was restored, on the one hand, by the European Union through economic sanctions imposed on Moscow, and on the other hand by the North Atlantic Alliance by intensifying the deployment of troops and armament on the eastern flank and by conducting bilateral and multinational military exercises in the Black Sea, but also at the land and air borders of the Eastern European states.

The theory of realism states that countries have a conscious or unconscious tendency to establish a balance of power. This theory is reflected in the geopolitical topicality of the Extensive Black Sea Region, identifying as elements of the balance, on the one hand, the Russian Federation, and on the other hand, as a counterweight, we find most of the other state entities. Obviously, Russia is the dominant state due to its territorial extent, but mostly due to natural resources and the exertion of economic blackmail against states considered unfriendly.

Under the Russia-Turkey binomial power, the Russian Federation's monopolization of the European energy market is interpreted by Turkey as attempts to undermine its position as a regional power center. By forcing Turkey to accept a lower position in the hierarchy of regional powers, it would feel constrained in the negotiations on regional energy routes.

The European External Relations Council has published a report - *The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe*⁹, in which it proposed the solution of a trilateral dialogue between the European Union, Russia and Turkey to build and strengthen a European climate of security.

The fundamental elements of this construction have been identified as:

- a trilateral dialogue - EU, Russia, Turkey - on European security;
- an action plan for the security of the enlarged Black Sea region and European security, having as a main method of action defusing frozen conflicts - a major source of insecurity;
- a European Security Treaty that would make the EU the main actor for regional security.

⁹ Mihail Ionescu, *Regiunea Extinsă a Mării Negre*, Editura Militară, București, 2009.



Yet, the wider Black Sea region will remain a direct confrontation space for Russia and Turkey. The improvement of the relations between Ankara and Moscow does not mean that the two regional power centers have given up important points in their own external agendas and it has not led to the complete disappearance of sensitive issues generating regional instability either.

Russia aims at restoring its own sphere of influence, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, blocking or slowing down the process of expanding the North Atlantic Organization in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and maintaining control over European countries' access to Caspian energy resources.

In its ambition for the role of a regional power center, Turkey has proven to have the necessary capabilities to engage in diplomatic and economic confrontations for access to Caspian natural resources and to become a viable alternative to securing future energy routes.

It is noteworthy that Turkey has evolved from its remote attitude displayed to Moscow during the Cold War, to cooperation and openness. Turkey's policies and strategies were sometimes similar or close to those of Moscow. A significant aspect is given by the fact that the strength of Turkey's naval military forces is clearly superior to the Russian fleet of the Crimean Black Sea.

Conclusions

Within the relations in the wider Black Sea region, there is a balance of threats, a concept that includes the balance of power, adapted to the mutable features of the regional security environment. The practice of the current international relations in the analyzed region cannot be fully defined by the concept of the balance of power. For this purpose, the balance of threat theory is much more appropriate due to its complexity.

In the power balance economy of the Wider Black Sea Region, Bulgaria is an active partner in ensuring regional security as a NATO and EU member state. If during the Cold War, Bulgaria was a satellite of the Soviet Union, after the disappearance of the USSR, Bulgaria changed its orientation towards the West, acquiring NATO and EU membership. By its geographical position, Bulgaria offers NATO a significant presence in the Black Sea. After the events of 2014-2015 in Ukraine, Bulgaria began to be



subject to intense economic blackmail from the Russian Federation, which is trying to rebuild its USSR sphere of influence.

The final element of the balance of threat analysis is represented by the offensive intentions of a state, especially given the perception of its intentions by weaker states. They will tend to rally against the state perceived as a threat to their security, even if the power of the latter is not considerable.

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SYRIA - THE SPACE OF A CONFLICT WITH VARIABLE GEOMETRY AND UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES

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***Abstract:** The Middle East is the most sensitive area of the world from a political, economic, social, cultural and religious point of view, the environment where state and non-state actors are disputing their interests in controlling energy resources, their flows, and at the same time marked by challenges, vulnerabilities, and conflicts.*

In this context, the war in Syria met the characteristics of a conflict with variable geometry, which included various forms, from civil war, war against terrorism, proto-war, interest-based war, proxy war, and widespread international war.

Given the characteristics of the variable geometry conflict, within it there were a lot of conventional, unconventional, irregular (asymmetric), non-kinetic, and humanitarian assistance operations that took place.

The complex and multiple consequences of the war in Syria justify the need to increase resilience in addressing and understanding the physiognomy of conflicts with variable geometry for the development and application of appropriate response options.

***Keywords:** conflict with variable geometry, proxy conflict, extended international conflict, unconventional operations, irregular operations, humanitarian crisis.*

Introduction

The Middle East has been and continues to be a heterogeneous, fragmented and unstable space marked by multiple challenges, vulnerabilities and conflicts.

In this context, we may say that the Middle East constitutes a space with many political, economic, social, religious and cultural sensitivities and imbalances which leads to a fierce debate of strategic interests among a wide range of state and non-state actors. At the same time, the Middle East is the scene where the interests and actions of various local, regional and global actors threaten the balance of forces through the manifestation of influence in certain areas, in relation to the strategies and objectives set by the political factor.



Repositioning actors to trace new areas of influence in the Middle East generates a broad spectrum of political, economic, social, and religious actions combined with violent military explosions that include various crises and conflicts with variable geometry and unpredictable consequences¹.

Thus, there are more and more opinions that the Middle East is a strategic interest area for several state and non-state actors, because in this space there is virulence in the “export of revolution”, “export of terrorism”, “fierce dispute over resources”, resulting in control and influence over the states in the region².

In this respect, we consider that the Middle East is not only an area rich in natural energy resources but also a source for Islamic radicalized fundamentalism that stimulates the emergence of terrorism and generates large “metastasis” which threatens security at local, regional and global level. In addition to the manifestation of this terrorist scourge, the exacerbation of the phenomenon of migration in Europe has created instability and disagreements between states and the EU, which affects regional security and generates disputes and controversies among political leaders.

Under these extremely turbulent and violent conditions, where multiple interests of political, economic, social, military, religious and cultural nature overlap, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the Middle East situation if the power centers are reconfigured and reach peace, or the conflict with variable geometry continues, and actors who disprove their interests and control and influence areas adopt strategies that will give advantage or disadvantage to one of the parties (“win-win”, “win-lose” or “lose-lose” strategies).

This is the context in which some states of the Middle East and North Africa started “the Arab Spring”, and in Syria “the Syrian Spring” as the embodiment of opposition to dictatorial and unreformed regimes in the respective countries³.

In Syria, the existence of a totalitarian regime characterized by precarious economic and social conditions, the restriction of citizens’

¹ The National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019, București, 2015, p.12.

² <https://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/societate/articol/oprirea-violentei-religioase-din-orientul-mijlociu>, accessed on 28.03.2019.

³ https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C4%83zboiul_Civil_Sirian, accessed on 28.03.2019.



fundamental freedoms, the high degree of corruption and the brutal actions of the government have generated street moves and protests for the removal of the Bashar Al-Assad regime.

The variable geometry conflict

In the following pages, we will look at the ways in which the conflict with variable geometry in Syria has evolved, taking different forms, from the “peaceful revolution” to “civil war”, then to the “war on terrorism” and “extended international conflict” involving several state and non-state actors.

Concerning the manifestation of the conflict with variable geometry in Syria, there are several opinions expressed in various specialized papers.

A first approach focuses on the fact that a *geopolitical and geo-economic conflict* took place in Syria, which began as a civil war between internal actors (government forces and the opposition/Syrian Free Army) based on the gas pipeline crusade, supported by the control over the natural, economic and financial resources, and religion⁴.

If we initially believe that a political battle between internal actors (protests, insurgency, escalation of civil warfare actions) took place, with external support, it later turned into a real dispute over the control of energy resources and flows between major powers (US and the Russian Federation).

From a geo-economic point of view, who controls the flow of energy resources for Europe becomes an important economic actor in the area, and Syria could obtain this status if the interests of the great powers did not intersect to gain control of this area.

In this conflict, the Islamist State terrorist group was involved aiming at occupying a territory in Syria and Iraq, creating the Islamic caliphate and controlling the energy resources in the area⁵.

This conflict has generated a major humanitarian crisis by accentuating the migration phenomenon and increasing refugee flows to neighboring countries and those of the EU⁶.

⁴<http://www.contributors.ro/economie/energie-economie/razboiul-civil-din-siria-un-razboi-al-gazoductelor/>, accessed on 28.03.2019.

⁵ Mirela Atanasiu, *Influența conflictului din Nordul Africii și Orientului Mijlociu asupra securității europene – studiu de cercetare științifică* – Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2016, p.28.



This resulted in disastrous consequences on the war on energy resources; moreover, a state like Syria failed in this process, resulting in large losses among the population, unprecedented humanitarian crisis, a massive migration phenomenon.

From this perspective, the geopolitical and geo-economic conflict in Syria offers a free way to the cause of the Russian Federation, Iran and Iraq, which provides and controls the transport of energy resources to Europe via the Mediterranean without intermediaries.

In view of these consequences, which have caused great political, economic and social imbalances in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular, huge losses and destruction, a massive humanitarian crisis, the escape of a large number of citizens to Europe, we also adopt the idea of some analysts who say that the war in Syria, through its consequences and scale, was “a war for nothing”⁷.

A second approach concerns the fact that in Syria there has in fact been a *proto-war* in which several internal and external actors are involved in two overlapping conflicts, a civil war, and a war against the Islamic State.

The civil war consisted in escalating tensions between the Syrian government and the rebel groups (the opposition) and turning them into an armed insurgency aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime and making democratic reforms in Syria.

In this regard, the Syrian government on the one hand and the rebel armed groups on the other hand became the main enemies of the civil war, being backed by sponsor states.

Thus, the Assad regime had as main allies the Russian Federation, Iran and the Hezbollah Movement, and the rebel groups in the US, Turkey and some Arab states in the area.

In this respect, two confrontation axes were structured, the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the moderate rebels versus the Russian Federation, Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah, the Assad Regime.

The war against the Islamic State focused on the confrontation between the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and the Islamic Anti-State

⁶ Mirela Atanasiu, *Influența conflictului din Nordul Africii și Orientului Mijlociu asupra securității europene – studiu de cercetare științifică* – Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2016, p. 46.

⁷ <https://www.cotidianul.ro/siria-un-razboi-pentru-nimic/>, accessed on 28.03.2019.



Coalition consisting of the USA, France, England, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, the Syrian government, the Russian Federation, Iran and the Hezbollah Movement acted against the Islamic State.

In this context, the war on terrorism between state and non-state actors has become asymmetrical/irregular. In this respect, anti-ISIS forces carried out air operations to attack terrorist groups, infrastructure elements, weapons and equipment depots and their combat facilities, and ISIS and Al-Qaeda forces carried out irregular, guerrilla actions aimed at conquering some areas (cities), maintaining the state of permanent terror on the population, resulting in a major humanitarian crisis.

Thus, we can say that ISIS actions have modelled the asymmetry of terror with disastrous consequences at the human level through the high degree of violence and radicalism of terrorist fighters. Regarding the extremely violent actions of ISIS conducted indiscriminately against local and foreign citizens, the question was whether the anti-ISIS coalition forces could overcome the asymmetry or irregular war between state and non-state actors will turn into a continual confrontation, with unpredictable consequences and resolution.

In addition to the two conflicts described above, a new type of action was developed by Kurdish fighters in northern Syria against the Islamic State.

At the same time, Kurdish fighters being supported by the US led to tensions in relations with Turkey, which is in constant conflict with the Kurdish group. This was the reason why during the conflict in Syria, Turkey reoriented its policy towards strengthening relations with the Russian Federation and Iran, US declared adversaries.

A third approach addresses the fact that an *extended conflict*, intrastate and inter-state conflict in Syria overlapped with the war on terror.

In this regard, we can state that in Syria there was an extended conflict, as it was characterized by the large number of state and non-state actors involved, the diversity and physiognomy of the military actions carried out, the ways of achieving the strategic objectives and the magnitude of the consequences in the political, economic, social, cultural, religious and military field.

Intrastate conflict refers to the actions of the State Armed Forces acting as a state actor (the Assad government regime) against one or more



non-state actors (moderate opposition, grouping of armed rebels, terrorist groups etc.) to achieve opposing objectives (the state aims at defeating opponents and keeping in power, the opponent aims to overthrow government forces and take over power in the state)⁸.

In Syria, the intra-state conflict took place gradually, initially in the form of protests that turned into insurgent actions, then civil war between the parties, with external support, the government forces being supported by the Russian Federation⁹, and moderate US opposition.

The inter-state conflict concerns the actions of actors of different states or the actions of two foreign actors who dispute their interests in the territory of a third country.

In Syria, the inter-state conflict opposed the actions of two state actors, Israel and Iran, each supported by two global powers, the US and the Russian Federation respectively.

The war against terrorism involved the confrontation between several state actors (the Syrian government, the US-led ISIS Coalition, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Iran) and non-state actors (ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist factions). Thus, the purpose of this confrontation was to defeat the terrorist groups who wanted the creation of an Islamic caliphate in western Iraq and eastern Syria.

In this respect, the extended conflict has become international through the participation of many actors, making complex connections between them according to the nature of the objectives targeted by each party¹⁰.

For example, we may present the main connections made between the actors involved in the extended international conflict in Syria: between government forces - moderate opposition; between governmental forces-ISIS; between the anti-ISIS-Islamist-Al-Qaeda terrorist group; between the Russian Federation and ISIS; between Turkey-ISIS; between Kurdish

⁸https://www.google.com/search?q=razboi+intrastatal+siria&rlz=1C1CHBF_enRO834RO834&oq=razboi+intrastatal+siria&aqs=chrome..69i57.29182j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=, accessed on 28.03.2019.

⁹ Policy Paper nr.20/2016, Andra Dodiță, Reacții arabe și evoluții după intervenția militară a Rusiei în Siria, București, 2016, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Dinamica mediului de securitate*, februarie-martie 2018, CSSAS, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2018, p. 8.



fighters -ISIS; between Turkey-Kurdish fighters; between Israel and Iran (Hezbollah Movement)¹¹.

A fourth approach focuses on the fact that in Syria a *fourth-generation conflict* took place, involving at least one non-state actor¹².

The Fourth Generation Conflict aims at a combination of several types of political, economic and military actions involving combatants, insurgents, terrorist groups and civilians, following the pattern expressed in the tryptic “conflict-peace-reconstruction”.

The fourth-generation conflict is irregular, asymmetric and atypical, uses insurgent, guerrilla and terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, and targets political, cultural, religious, or even manipulation of the population.

This type of conflict manifested itself in Syria through the actions of the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups that had as their political target the creation of Islamic caliphate, the manipulation of the local population, and the acceptance by international public opinion of the accomplished fact strategy.

The anti-ISIS Coalition was immediate and consistent, ending up with the defeat of Islamic State terrorist groups, even if their elimination was not achieved. Henceforth, the fourth-generation, irregular, asymmetric and atypical warfare involving non-state actors, aimed at insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist and organized crime actions, which is ongoing, generating instability, the export of terror and violence over extended spaces.

A fifth approach focuses on the fact that in Syria there was an *interest-based conflict* (called civil, proto-war, against terrorism, expanded etc.) in which the actors involved acted on several levels: national level (internally) between government forces and opposition rebel factions; at regional level between the middle powers to express their own interests (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates); between state and non-state actors; between the powers that disputed global hegemonic interests

¹¹<https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-22284399-razboiul-din-siria-transforma-intr-conflict-regional-riscul-unei-conflagratii-extinse.htm>, accessed on 28.03.2019.

¹² Revista *Impact strategic nr.1/2017*, pp. 56-57.



(the US and its allies, the Russian Federation) and aimed at controlling areas of influence in the Middle East¹³.

This approach demonstrates how different regional and global actors have been positioned for the conflict in Syria and the ISIS actions, how they have promoted and defended their interests and especially the place they have occupied in the reconfiguration of power centers at the end of the conflict.

We have left for the end of approaching and justifying the conflict with variable geometry in Syria the idea that claims that this conflict took place through *third parties (interposed)* and met the characteristics of *a proxy war*.

The proxy war is the conflict between two powers (armed forces, state actors) through intermediaries (*interposed*) in the territory of another country¹⁴.

It follows that in the proxy war the parties are not engaged directly against one another but through intermediaries, which may be state or non-state actors.

In this regard, the conflict in Syria has the characteristics of a proxy war between the US and the Russian Federation, led by intermediaries. Thus, the Russian Federation supports the government forces, and the US, the moderate opposition in the confrontation of the two adversaries¹⁵.

The Russian Federation's political objective in Syria is to keep the Assad regime in place to ensure control and influence in the area of strategic interest, and the US seeks to remove Bashar al-Assad from power and democratize the country.

At the same time, this confrontation through intermediaries between the two power centers has multiple consequences, not only politically but also economically, by obtaining and maintaining control over the energy flows that cross Syria and are directed through the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe.

Thus, it can be said that all the actions carried out in Syria by the internal and regional actors are subordinated to the strategic interests of the US and the

¹³ Mirela Atanasiu, *Influența conflictului din Nordul Africii și Orientului Mijlociu asupra securității europene – studiu de cercetare științifică* – Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2016, p. 35.

¹⁴ Revista *Impact strategic* nr.3/2015, pp. 21-22.

¹⁵<https://www.timpul.md/articol/cnn-conflictul-din-siria-se-transforma-intr-un-razboi-intre-statele-unite-si-rusia-80880.html>, accessed on 28.03.2019.



Russian Federation, the true orchestra conductors who play the acute and serious tones of the conflict with variable geometry and disastrous consequences.

A synthetic presentation of the ways to approach the war in Syria justifies the fact that it meets the characteristics of a variable geometry conflict, given the multitude of actors involved, the types of operations carried out, the tactics, techniques and procedures used, the unpredictable consequences and the nature of the objectives targeted for controlling areas of influence and strategic interest.

In this context, the initial protests widened and turned into a civil war that overlapped with an irregular (asymmetric) warfare carried out by the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups, then the conflict became international and expanded, having the characteristics of a proto-war and a proxy war.

To these forms specific to the conflict with variable geometry, we should add the information actions as well as special forces', cybernetic, psychological, media, diplomatic actions, beside those that targeted the chemical weapons attacks.

Types of operations conducted within the context of variable geometry conflict

Next, we are going to analyse the main *types of operations* in Syria in the context of the conflict with variable geometry.

In this respect, we may say that the following types of operations in Syria, integrated into the conflict with variable geometry: conventional operations; unconventional operations; irregular (asymmetric) operations; non-kinetic operations; humanitarian assistance operations.

Conventional operations are based on the actions of the armed forces to achieve political and military objectives. In this context, conventional operations in Syria aimed at the execution of air strikes and the use of missile systems by the US, England, France and the Russian Federation on terrestrial targets of the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups.

Thus, they were subjected to air and missile attacks, command centers, logistics and infrastructure capabilities of ISIS to neutralize them and diminish the terrorist combat potential¹⁶.

¹⁶ Revista *Puls geostrategic*, nr.175/2014, p. 15.



The air strike executed by the USA, France and England on the Syrian targets used for the production or storage of chemical weapons are also in the category of conventional operations.

Unconventional operations include the actions of special operations forces, illegal/secret actions and the use of CBRN weapons in planning areas by the state/non-state actor intending to do so.

Special Forces Operations Missions in Syria aimed at fulfilling several objectives on the actions of Syrian government forces, moderate opposition, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other actors involved in the conflict in its various phases. In this respect, the main missions of the Special Operations Force focused on military assistance (both from the Russian Federation for US forces and the US for moderate opposition), special research of areas of interest and some direct actions on terrorist groups.

The illegal/secret operations concerned the actions of Russian and Syrian paramilitary troops against US units and Syrian democratic forces, mostly Kurdish in northeast of Syria. In this respect, the boundary between the proxy war and the illegal/secret operations is very easy to cross and it is difficult to see the type of action that is taking place.

The use of the chemical weapon during Syria's conflict constituted an alarm signal for international public opinion, especially as chemical agents were used in fights against cities and unprotected and neutral civilians. In this respect, the use of chemical weapons in 2013 in the Syrian Ghouta region produced disastrous effects on the civilian population, the assault being attributed to the Assad regime. In this case, although there was an intention of a US military intervention in Syria, it did not happen¹⁷.

The chemical attack in the Douma region in April 2018 on the civilian population (the opposition) attributed to the Syrian government determined the United States to join forces with France and England in Syria¹⁸.

Thus, an air operation (air strikes and missile launches) was carried out on facilities used for the production and storage of chemical weapons (a

¹⁷ *Dinamica mediului de securitate*, aprilie-mai 2017, CSSAS, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2017, pp. 14-15.

¹⁸ *Dinamica mediului de securitate*, februarie-martie 2018, CSSAS, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2018, p. 10.



command center, a chemical research center for chemical weapons research, several chemical weapons storage facilities).

At the same time, in Syria, chemical weapons were also used by the Islamic State, which had a program for the endowment and use of chemical agents¹⁹.

In this context, it may be said that ISIS used chemical agents in Iraq and Syria in three stages, starting in 2014 until 2017. After that, with the loss of Mosul, the production of chemical weapons was apparently abandoned by ISIS. It is considered that the US was successful in combating the ISIS procurement and use of chemical weapons program²⁰.

Irregular operations are based on indirect and asymmetric approaches and target the atypical response of non-state actors to the actions of state actors to offset their technological, information and decision-making superiority and meet the set objectives.

In this respect, in the Syrian conflict with variable geometry, irregular operations initially included the insurgent actions of armed rebel groups (subsequently transformed into the Syrian Free Army) against the Assad regime, followed by violent, insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist and organized crime executed by the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups in the territories of Iraq and Syria.

These conditions led to the emergence of the cross-border terrorist phenomenon through the recrudescence of jihadism in the form of neo-jihadism, whose representative is ISIS.

The guerrilla actions of ISIS that use violence, terror, fear of achieving so-called “Islamic cleaning” have generated a true “constructive anarchy”, also called “the theory of constructive chaos”²¹.

The response to ISIS and Al-Qaeda was complex, being executed by several state actors (Syrian government, Russian Federation, Turkey) or coalitions (anti-ISIS Coalition consisting of USA, France and England) and aimed at developing some anti-insurgency, anti-guerrilla, anti-terrorist and organized anti-crime activities.

¹⁹ *Revista de specialitate pentru arma Apărare CBRN, nr.1 (27)*, Câmpulung-Muscel, 2018, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, p. 60.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 62-63.

²¹ *Revista Puls geostrategic, nr.175/2014*, pp. 20-21.



Several action procedures were used in these operations, ultimately leading to the defeat of the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and the annihilation of their dream of creating an Islamic caliphate on the territories of Iraq and Syria.

Non-kinetic operations included information, cyber, psychological, and media actions performed by state and non-state actors participating in the Syrian conflict with variable geometry.

The information actions overlapped at several levels, being employed in Syria and Arab states, in the inter-Arab confrontation on a regional level and between the regional and the western states. To this end, each entity concentrated its efforts to obtain information of interest that would enable them to use strategies in line with the established political, economic and military objectives.

Thus, the actions carried out in the information environment and the concentration of state and non-state actors' efforts to obtain, evaluate and disseminate vital information to the beneficiaries have been an important milestone in the conflict in Syria.

Cyber actions targeted the information systems of all state and non-state actors involved in the conflict, in terms of penetrating and affecting the opponents' computer networks²².

Psychological, propaganda and influence actions included a broad spectrum of actors, from those directly involved in the conflict, civilian population, and international public opinion. Thus, in psychological actions, the approach plans overlapped, each actor intending to benefit from and justify the actions performed in each phase of the conflict. In this regard, the conflict in Syria, in its size, diversity and consequences, has forced states to rethink strategies to counter psychological actions based on the management of perception, thought, and behavior of people (the population) in situations of crisis or conflict.

Media activities aimed at presenting various views on the conflict in Syria, justifying the legality of the executed actions. The news provided by the media through various channels of communication (written, audio-

²²<https://www.firstplay.ro/2016/10/11/al-jazeera-lanseaza-jocul-hacked-care-va-pune-transele-razboiului-cibernetice-din-siria/>, accessed on 28.03.2019.



visual, virtual) were true, false or combined, expressing each time the interests of those who have issued them²³.

Only by analyzing the times when the chemical weapon was used on areas with civilian populations, the media disputes among the main actors (US, Russian Federation, Syrian government) on attributing the paternity of these attacks were ample, and a plausible and acceptable response was not found by the parties.

In this regard, we can express our opinion that the media activities during the conflict in Syria were complex, each actor presenting the “reality on the ground”, depending on their own interests and the need to justify the actions.

Humanitarian assistance operations ranged from the US support of the moderate opposition and that provided by the Russian Federation to the Assad government to the measures taken by different states and by the EU, the UN and other international bodies for the support of refugees in Syria, as a result of the unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

These actions aimed at helping refugees who migrated to Western countries to integrate them into these societies, combined with the measures envisaged to repatriate part of the migrants to the countries of origin, are the greatest challenge for the UN, the EU and other international bodies in the field.

By summarizing these types of operations in Syria, we wanted to motivate the nature, characteristics and physiognomy of the conflict with variable geometry, and state that in the future this will be the typology of conflict, a combination of complex measures, activities and actions, multi-layered, overlapping, transforming, integrated, and interconnected, according to the interests and strategic objectives of the participating actors. Moreover, if these conflicts generate major humanitarian crises that cannot be managed locally or regionally, then a comprehensive, global approach to their consequences is required.

In the Syrian conflict, the armaments and combat equipment used were complex and diversified, being used in all environments (cosmic, air, land, naval, and virtual).

²³ Policy Paper nr.20/2016, Andra Dodiță, *Reacții arabe și evoluții după intervenția militară a Rusiei în Siria*, București, 2016, p. 12.



The main state actors used a wide range of air strikes (cluster bombs, thermobaric weapons and incendiary bombs) and rocket systems (multiple, cruise, ballistic).

Non-state actors (ISIS and Syrian opposition) used light weapons, armored vehicles and anti-tank missiles to penetrate the armor of their opponent's vehicles.

Also, chemical agents (sarin, chlorine, Sulphur mustard) were used by various state and non-state actors on predominantly civilian targets.

The effects of the Syrian conflict are complex and include many losses and destruction, emergence of typhoid fever epidemics, tuberculosis, dysentery, hepatitis, human rights violations, religious persecution and exacerbation of crime.

Besides these, the water crisis, the reduction of water reserves and the food shortages make the serious situation in Syria even worse²⁴.

To these consequences the large humanitarian crisis that consisted in the migration of millions of people to other neighboring states of Syria and to the West is added.

This state of affairs resulting from the exacerbation of the migratory phenomenon has disturbed the entire world and has led to rethinking, re-evaluating and developing new policies and strategies that maintain a balance of security at local, regional and global level.

If, so far, we have identified and presented the main milestones of the Syrian conflict with variable geometry and its consequences, we consider that it is of interest to highlight the vision of the main regional and global actors about the geopolitical and geostrategic post-conflict situation in the Middle East.

In this regard, we will address the US, Russian Federation and EU strategies for returning to normality after the conflict with variable geometry in Syria has ended.

The United States, as an actor directly involved in the conflict in Syria, has developed a strategy that includes the following elements: the abolition of the ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and the ongoing

²⁴<https://www.descopera.ro/dnews/16058800-efectele-devastatoare-ale-razboiului-din-siria-rezervele-de-apa-s-au-injumatatit-consecintele-se-vad-inclusiv-din-spatiu-foto>, accessed on 28.03.2019.



monitoring of all such organizations; ensuring that Syria, as any other state, is no longer a platform or shelter for terrorist groups, where they can organize, recruit, finance, train and attack; the conflict in Syria to be politically solved, and post-Assad Syria to be stable, unified and to no longer possess weapons of mass destruction; the influence of Iran in Syria to be diminished; concerted actions to be organized at international level for the return of refugees to Syria and providing the necessary support.

This strategy shows that in the Middle East, the US considers terrorist groups and Iran as continuing threats to state security, supports the idea of a democratic Syrian democracy following the Assad regime, and supports international action to resolve the humanitarian crisis politically.

The Russian Federation is involved in solving the conflict in Syria by political means and through regional and global negotiations.

In this respect, the strategic elements of the Russian Federation include: the fight against terrorist groups everywhere, but especially in the Middle East; maintaining the Assad regime in Syria and strengthening cooperation; maintaining areas of influence (interest) on Syrian territory through the ports and aerodromes it holds in its western part and giving it access to the Mediterranean Sea; involvement in the management of energy resource flows through Syria for the preservation of Russia's economic interests; strengthening relations with Turkey and Iran to counterbalance US influence in the Middle East (US relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia).

It is obvious that the Russian Federation wants to maintain Syria's pre-conflict status quo and expand its political, economic and military interests in the area to counter US options.

The EU has barely sustained the shock caused by the exacerbation of the migration phenomenon and is looking for solutions for the reasonable management of its consequences. Thus, at the level of the EU Member States, the phenomenon of migration is approached differently and there is no consensus in the unitary interpretation of this issue. In this respect, the EU states have divided views in addressing the ways to solve the problems resulting from the Syrian humanitarian crisis, but efforts have been made to find reasonable and accepted solutions by all.

Thus, EU migration policy includes a set of measures aimed at: political settlement of the conflict in Syria, involving key regional and global actors; stopping migration and terrorism exports from the Middle



East to the EU countries; assimilation and integration of migrants in EU countries by allocating them on the basis of quotas; making sustained efforts to repatriate a significant proportion of migrants to their countries of origin; creating and operationalizing specialized structures at EU level (justice, information, defense) in order to increase the level of security of the Member States.

Conclusions

These are the main milestones we have considered as arguments that in Syria a geometrically variable conflict with complex and diverse architecture, involving a wide range of state and non-state actors, has developed a typology and the aims and objectives in question were in line with the nature of the political, economic and military interests of the parties involved in the conflict.

The escalation of the internal warfare in Syria, its transformation into an expanded international conflict that included a wide range of conventional, unconventional, irregular (asymmetric), non-kinetic, and humanitarian support operations executed by various state and non-state actors proved the fact that the nature of the war has changed and that it is necessary to increase resilience in addressing and understanding the physiognomy of variable geometry conflicts to develop and apply appropriate response options.

That is why we believe that the development and consequences of the conflict with variable geometry in Syria must be an object of attention of the Romanian political and military decision-makers to understand the paradigm changes in the military phenomenon and to develop the strategic, operative and tactical culture of the personnel in the management structures in order to find the most appropriate response solutions in the event of complex risks and threats in areas of strategic interest.

Finally, we consider that the analysis of the conflict with variable geometry in Syria is a useful strategic study for military decision-makers and specialists directed towards the understanding of its dimensions, architecture and physiognomy of the operations carried out, so that efficient options and responses can be formulated, turned into plans, scenarios, hypotheses and tactical exercises, meant to prepare the command and training of forces in the Romanian Armed Forces.



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17. * * * <https://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/societate/articol/oprirea-violentei-religioase-din-orientul-mijlociu>.



MIGRATION OF LABOR FORCE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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***Abstract:** The issue of labor migration at the level of the European Union is a complex one, especially in the context of the Union experiencing a large wave of migrants from the Middle East. Although most of these migrants are refugees from the war, the reality is that they also include people leaving the country of origin in order to gain better access to the labor market, especially to the labor market at the level of the European Union. Within the domain of labor mobility, the focus will be on the actual changes made by EU member states in improving the conditions for access to employment in the EU market, both for citizens of the member states, and especially for those of tertiary member states. Practically, the focus is going to fall on the Union's migration policy, as well as on the rights and obligations of the European worker.*

***Key words:** push factors, pull factors, migratory flows, migration, asylum, atypical forms of employment.*

Introduction

The European Union has outlined a migration policy, being somewhat constrained by the global context in which migration is a reality that is impossible to control and, in the last period, even impossible to reduce. In fact, the European Union is adapting to the phenomenon of globalization that has generated unmanageable migratory flows in recent times. Thus, the European Union's migration policy is designed to provide solutions that enable states to cope with migratory flows and their consequences.



In this context, it was easy for the Union to build such a policy, as it already had the components of “migration” and “asylum” in the third pillar of Maastricht - Justice and Home Affairs. Through its development, the Union has attempted to create both a migrant integration dimension, and also to apply the principles of solidarity and unity in diversity, to ensure a balance between the culture of the migrant (the culture of the country of origin) and the culture of the state where he/she got to. However, it should be noted that there are a number of costs to be taken into account in managing the phenomenon at Union level: the need to integrate migrants, to control and combat illegal immigration and to control external borders.

Migration of the labor force in the EU

As there are not enough elements to turn migration policy into a common policy, the European Union is working on improving the following issues: regulating and controlling migration, combating illegal migration, integrating migrants, whether temporary or permanent, the development of international cooperation on asylum and migration by unifying the general aspects of managing the two phenomena, establishing a framework at European level to attract as much work force as possible¹.

Regarding the dynamics of the labor market at the level of the European Union, following the development of the European Union and the emergence of new member states, there was also noticed an increase in the migratory flows, which had an important advance during the 2000s. As for the origin of the migrants, it was found both in the Union and outside. In the case of the first category, the motivation is usually an economic one, in the case of non-European citizens wishing to enter the Union, the motivation is, lately, a state of conflict in the territory of their states: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan etc.

This dynamics of the European Union labor market has been influenced by a number of factors, both in the country of origin (push factors) and in the host country (pull factors)². Beyond the factors mentioned above, such as the need for access to a better standard of living,

¹ Popa Mădălina, Ungureanu Dragoș, Oneașcă Iulian (coord.), *Politica de migrație a Uniunii Europene: implicații pentru piața muncii*, Buzău, Alpha Mdn, 2013.

² ***, *Migration and migrant population statistics*, Eurostat, March 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/migration_and_migrant_population_statistics, accessed on 20.10.2018.



professional development etc. - economic factors such as the economic crisis, political, social, environmental and even image factors can also be added. For example, the image of the prosperity and stability of the European Union has played an important role in attracting workforce, both internally and externally.

In 2016, some 4.3 million people emigrated to one of the EU Member States. Of these, about 2 million were non-EU citizens, 1.3 million citizens of an EU Member State, 929,000 EU citizens who returned to their state of origin and about 16,000 stateless persons³. As it can be seen, migratory flows record all movements of individuals as migration, whether they are going to a state other than home or returning to the state of origin. From the point of view of the attractiveness of immigration destinations, the largest number of emigrants was recorded in Western European states in 2016, justified by their economic power, but also by the image of a job market for the Central and East European states.

From the point of view of the percentage of immigrants⁴ in 2016, the situation is as follows: Germany 1,029,900 and Spain 414,700.

From the point of view of the percentage of emigrants⁵, the situation in the European Union is the following: Germany 533,800, United Kingdom 340,400, Spain 327,300, France 309,800, Poland 236,400, Romania 207,600.

At the level of the Member States of the European Union, in the case of the following countries, the percentage of emigrants exceeded that of immigrants: Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania.

At the opposite pole⁶ of immigration there are very few states: Luxembourg, with 39 immigrants / 1000 people and Malta with 38 immigrants / 1000 people. On 1 January 2017, 21.6 million citizens of a non-EU state, representing 4.2% of the Union's population (EU-28), were

³ ***, *Migration and migrant population statistics*, Eurostat, March 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/migration_and_migrant_population_statistics, accessed on 20.10.2018.

⁴ ***, *Migration and migrant population statistics*, *op.cit.*

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ *Ibidem.*



living in the European Union. There are also 16.9 million citizens of an EU Member State living within the Union⁷.

With regard to the changes in the European Union's labor market over time, there have been fluctuations in terms of employment and unemployment trends, fluctuations in the social situation reflected in various measures taken to combat poverty and social exclusion, but also on revenue distribution. New forms of employment have also emerged - "atypical forms of employment", some of which led to what some authors in the field have called "precariousness"⁸. These elements are important for analyzing the dynamics of the labor market at the European Union level, as they give the measure of the acceptance and support offered at the level of the normative level for all the labor mobility in the Union and the related migration.

The economic crisis of 2008 was another significant moment in the management of the EU labor market, since, after this period, experienced recovery in the Member States led to situations where individuals opt for "bad jobs" insufficiently remunerated and poorly regulated in terms of contract duration, so that even in the post-crisis recovery situation there are a large number of individuals in the Union working in unsafe conditions (from the point of view of the employment contract) and poorly remunerated. This leads to the "precarious state" in which there is an entire social stratum⁹.

In the period 2002-2017, the employment rate at the European Union level for people aged 20-64 increased by 5.4%, from 66.8% to 72.2%¹⁰. Increases in employment rates were recorded in all EU countries, except in Greece, Denmark, Cyprus and Portugal¹¹.

In terms of gender distribution, in 2017 the employment rate was higher for males than for women. However, these percentages have to be

⁷ ***, *Migration and migrant population statistics, op.cit.*

⁸ A. Piasna, *'bad jobs' recovery? european job quality index 2005-2015*, European Trade Union Institute, Working Paper 2017, available at <https://www.etui.org/publications2/working-papers/bad-jobs-recovery-european-job-quality-index-2005-2015>, accessed on 14.11.2018.

⁹ A. Piasna, *'bad jobs' recovery? european job quality index 2005-2015, op.cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁰ ***, *Employment statistics*, Eurostat, November 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/employment_statistics, accessed on 10.11.2018.

¹¹ *Ibidem.*



taken merely as figures, as the survey did not take into account students (included in the 15-24 age group) that were not considered active persons economically¹². Also, those who do not study, are not following a certain training program or merely unemployed are also to be considered.

These people contribute even more to the difficulty of analyzing unemployment, especially since their percentage is significant for the 15-29 age group - 14.3% in 2017¹³.

Labor market management has gone through several phases since the Second World War, as the social system at the time intended to provide security and stability for millions of individuals in the form of 8-hour labor contracts per period indefinite, for 6 and then 5 working days a week.

However, in the 1980s, due to technological changes and the need for globalization, as well as the need to harmonize EU legislation, several forms of employment appeared to be considered “atypical” as compared to the classical ones: the part-time contract, the determined period of contract, free lancers, people working from home, self-employed persons, zero hours contract, etc.¹⁴ Although such contracts favor greater labor mobility, allowing the employee to harmoniously combine personal and professional life, they still have a big disadvantage - it does not provide stability or security in terms of income, and it is not a constant one. On the contrary, since they do not provide such stability, individuals are tempted to try to hold more jobs at the same time to supplement their income, which has increased the number of hours worked per week, as well as those who work at weekends.¹⁵

Even under these conditions, the European Union needs as much external work force as possible. Due to demographic problems, a European

¹² Annamaria Artner, Krisztina Soreg, ”Working Labour Market Tendencies in the European Union”, în *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, vol. 18. no.1, June 2018, p. 75.

¹³ ***, *Education and Training Statistics at Regional Level*, Eurostat, March/April 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=education_and_training_statistics_at_regional_level#young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training_.28neet.29, accessed on 10.11.2018.

¹⁴ Annamaria Artner, Krisztina Soreg, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 85.



Commission report of 2016¹⁶ shows that by 2060 the European Union needs about 30 million extra-European immigrants to cover the labor force need. For this reason, various instruments have been created over time to provide funding for the labor market.

Such an instrument is the European Social Fund. It has been since the emergence of communities, but initially its purpose was to promote mobility, education and training. Significant change occurred in the 1970s, when it was found that new unemployment rates would become the rule and not the exception in the coming years. Since then, the European Social Fund budget has been increased and additional instruments have emerged - the Structural Funds - such as the European Regional Development Fund, whose purpose was to complement the labor market activity already under the umbrella of the European Social Fund¹⁷.

At the same time, in order to constantly revitalize the fund, several community programs have appeared to manage specific problems: Euroform - which promotes vocational education and then employment, Horizon - meant to train people with disabilities to be able to integrate into the labor market and NOW: New Opportunities for Women - a program specifically aimed at integrating women into the labor market¹⁸.

After 2015 the European Commission announced its efforts to establish a common migration policy, in order to boost the attractiveness of the Union in the eyes of third-country nationals, a number of changes had to be made in order to facilitate their access to the labor market work within the European Union.

A considerable change concerns the blue card regime (a residence and work permit that is especially available to highly qualified workers), which we will refer to in another article. In June 2016, the European Commission launched a proposal for a new "blue card" directive to provide a scheme for attracting highly qualified workers in a harmonized and

¹⁶ ***, *Employment and social developments in Europe 2015*, Chapter 2.2. Mobility and Migration. Commission Staff Working Document. European Commission, Brussels, 21.1.2016, swd (2016) 7 final, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2016/en/swd-2016-7-f1-en-main-part-6.pdf>, accessed on 23.10.2018.

¹⁷ Annamaria Artner, Krisztina Soreg, *op.cit.*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.



simplified manner across the European Union. It is therefore desirable to establish more flexible conditions for their admission to the territory of the Union and to facilitate intra-European mobility¹⁹.

Conclusions

The motivation behind labor migration is, as we have outlined in this article, determined by personal elements: the desire for professional development, the desire to provide children with a better life, the personal need for greater gain, etc. However, this motivation is responsible for the mobility of people who contribute to the overall development of the European project. The lack of a migration policy was very acute in the 1970s, when structural funds were created to provide the necessary help. Meanwhile, beyond the financial and professional aspects of labor migration, it also plays a significant role in terms of the moral and human development of the Union. Migration of the labor force provides the framework for intercultural dialogue and exchanges of values, ideas and mentality. By encouraging circular migration, the transfer of technology and know-how is ensured and the need to avoid a brain drain phenomenon is emphasized.

It is therefore necessary to make migration policy a common policy rather than a Community policy to ensure that all Member States have the same approaches, rules and regulations as regards internal migrants (those within the European Union), but also regarding external ones (those in tertiary countries). Such a comprehensive and unitary approach can only benefit the European Union, especially in the strongly social context shaken by Brexit. A first dilemma emerged immediately after the British vote in favor of leaving the European Union was that of European workers residing on British territory, but also the situation of British workers in European territory. As a consequence, the Brexit situation can serve as a case study for the future, especially in the direction of establishing a single approach, especially in those moments when it is considered necessary, as the case is with possible Brexit-like crises.

¹⁹ ***, 2016, *Annual Report on Migration and Asylum*, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.



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THE PARADIGM OF EXTENDED SECURITY / INSECURITY

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***Abstract:** Globalisation is a process which transforms inter-relations between states, national and global activities, with a different speed and duration, a process which does not bear only one universal definition. It spreads both security and insecurity, being very hard to establish an approximated ratio between the two processes.*

Knowing the risks, threats and hazards remains the duty of each nation but, more importantly, each state ought to know the vulnerabilities and, moreover, the imbalance of the dimensions of the globalisation. Hence the necessity to think and implement a strategic model of security/insecurity.

A mechanism regarding the evaluation, propagation and fight against insecurity sources must be achieved by including in the working teams experts who have held management positions, but also by involving the civil society.

***Keywords:** security, insecurity, security/insecurity mechanism, insecurity sources, extended security.*

The evolution of human society, resulting from the particularly complex (uneven, diverse and disturbing) reality, is often difficult to predict, chaotic, nonlinear. The world becomes more and more complex, more complicated and disturbing, the more we advance in time and space. We know where we want to go, where we go, but we do not have the certainty of going where we want. Even if we are at the core of human activity, the ability to understand, know, concretise, abstract and generalize, in other words to predict, plan and program almost everything, the future configuration of space is characterized by a conditional probability, a high degree of uncertainty .

Astrologers say that if the sun has risen every day until now, there is no certainty that it will rise tomorrow, too. Security, as a dynamic concern, a component of complex dynamic systems in continuous transformation, needs protection.



Extensive national security is “a theoretical concept quite complex and difficult to define, because the subjective perception of social groups or different schools of thought is involved”¹.

Extensive national security, as a part of national security, has been extensively addressed with viable arguments in the Country Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 - A Strong Romania in Europe and the World². It was drafted, presented and then approved by Parliament for the first time in the last 30 years, within the legal deadline. The entire content of this strategy highlights the fact that the power of a nation (common values, goals and ideals) is the consequence of a state that permanently protects and respects its own citizens.

The approach of security is performed nowadays from a systemic perspective. “As it is a multidimensional concept, all areas of activity (...) take steps to ensure the promotion of the specific interests of each individual area”³.

The dynamic and complex processes that mark the equally complex transformations of the security environment also need protection, and security. A first way to regulate the system involves self-regulation, the existence of an internal surveillance mechanism, developed and continuously updated. When it disappears, the system deteriorates, transforms, and finally disappears. This system must continually verify and detect, detect and remedy dysfunctions, discontinuities and vulnerabilities and effectively control the risks, dangers and threats created within the system in order to defend the country and preserve national security.

The external security mechanism / mechanisms must permanently verify outcomes, optimize relationships with other systems, identify, analyze, and continually counteract external risks, threats and dangers, ensuring its protection. “The complex and cross-border nature of security

¹ <http://www.la.punkt.ro>, interviu, Marian Zulean: *Ce este securitatea națională*, accessed on 03.05.2019.

² *Strategia de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2015-2019 – o Românie puternică în Europa și în Lume*, București, Administrația Prezidențială, 2015.

³ Colectiv, *De la securitatea individuală la securitatea colectivă*, Editura Bioterra, București, 2003, p. 5.



risks requires, more than ever, harmonizing their strategies for preventing, managing and combating them”⁴.

Between the two types of structures, components of defense and national security, there must be strong links, interdependencies and interferences. Their deterioration leads to systems vulnerability, transformation, alteration or even disappearance. Extensive national security elements, all with economic, political, information, cultural, social, ecological, etc. determinations, are creations of these mechanisms and are subject to these models. As a result, all existing systems have to face the dangers, threats and risks from all directions, both outward and inward. Because, most of the time, the spaces in which the risks, threats and dangers are created are the frontier ones, we need to know very well the vulnerabilities of each state, of each nation. We emphasize that “there is a direct relationship between security, stability and prosperity”⁵. Securing our borders, especially if we are considering national, political, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, economic, information frontiers, is becoming more and more important, more complicated and necessary today, when the process of accelerating globalization has taken on particularly impressive dimensions.

Risks and threats (that are omnidirectional), dangers (that are omnipresent) have intensified and diversified, generating real catastrophes, especially in the field of international relations, and may, in some situations, cause a complete change in the evolution of systems and processes. As a result, the real causes of military conflicts, some extremely bloody, are based on the chaotic evolution, impossible to control, with all its risks, dangers and threats. They are all sources of generating and regenerating insecurity and instability. Therefore, the science of extended national security must constantly be observed by all means of scientific research, ultimately seeking knowledge, analysis and, above all, counteracting risks and threats. At the same time, they must identify the conditions and criteria imposed by globalization, the main characteristics of this complex, dynamic, very dangerous cross-border phenomenon, but especially the sources of generation, the vulnerabilities and ways to reduce it.

⁴ Colectiv, *Lancea de silicon-impactul erei informațiilor asupra managementului crizei*, Editura Bioterra, 2004, p. 2.

⁵ <https://interviu.ro>, Daniel Ioniță, *O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume*, accessed on 03.05.2019.



Globalization takes place at an accelerated pace, being a necessary and natural process. It has not begun in this century; it is carried out with or without the will of men. It is a complex, flexible and dynamic architecture, trying to put the world in a whole, condensed time, shorten distances, attenuate some differences but emphasize others. It has many dimensions, many aspects, but also many features. As any dynamic and complex process, it requires continuous security in order to operate, streamline structures, counteract risks, threats and dangers, discover and mitigate vulnerabilities through appropriate preventive and proactive actions.

The phenomenon of globalization “has and will increasingly have a series of collateral and contradictory consequences, both positive and negative, which will affect all countries, including those in the process of confirmation or reconfirmation of their power, on the regional and global arena”⁶.

At the beginning of the 21st century, globalization imposes new requirements, new coordinates, new opportunities related to the dynamics and complexity of the process of globalization. The system has been functioning since there are states, borders and a complex of cross-border relationships. As a result, the phenomenon of globalization determines the shaping of policies and strategies, with a need for a new strategic model that gathers the facts and experiences accumulated over time. Some of these are detailed in the country’s defense strategy. The extensive national security strategy, which is spoken about in the above-mentioned strategy results from increased interdependencies, the amount of information, as well as risks, challenges, threats, threats and vulnerabilities.

Security goes beyond borders (across borders or over borders), but we cannot talk about a disappearance of borders. The civilization of the planet is composed of cultures, values, grouped in patrimony, but not beyond borders. Man cannot exist outside the borders, he needs limits and delimitations. With the last border, the last man will disappear, too.

Economics, trade, information, have other types of borders, economic, financial, commercial, that is, limits. If political boundaries fail to limit, control or manage, new rules of geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic games are imposed. Given the special position of Romania, on the one hand, as the country that holds most of the eastern border of the

⁶ Gheorghe Toma, Emil Hedeșiu, *Crima organizată transfrontalieră*, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2003, p. 17.



European Union and the NATO area and, on the other hand, the EU and NATO's concerns for the establishment and management of a stable security environment, the complex issue of extended national security becomes one of the priorities of the country's defense strategy, nowadays, and above all, for the future.

The uncertain and fluid security / insecurity environment, the major political, strategic, and economic mutations produced in the first decades of the 21st century highlight the need for a new framework of extended national security, under its many dimensions, a new, adapted and continuously improved one.

The necessity of a new model results also from the complexity and the huge area of the sources of insecurity, from their fluidity and intensity, from the possibility of combinations and recombination in very large dimensions - geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic, in other words, the dynamics of insecurity is as important as the dynamics of security.

Humanity does not need new "Iron Curtains, but export technology, ideology, interpersonal communication and direct, uninterrupted intercommunication, based on mutual respect, moderation and the will to solve disputes peacefully"⁷.

The insecurity strategies of adversaries / those considered adversaries are long-lasting, easy to see or hidden / top-secret, with geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic spaces, and the results are often disastrous, with crises, armed conflicts and bloody wars . Countries with resources (especially energy), but lacking the capacity to manage them, are under pressure and forced to accept the guidance and directions dictated by those who win the battle, get the strategic supremacy, and ultimately win the big finance international companies.

The Strategic Security Model should bring to the forefront a multilateral approach to security and insecurity, a system of principles and rules that must be applied to identify, assess, predict and combat all sources of insecurity. The model has the theoretical function of a rational recognition algorithm and the practical function of building and experimenting with grids for identification, monitoring, evaluation and diagnosis.

⁷ Neculai Onțanu, Mihail Orzeacă, *Lumea – un imens câmp de confruntări*, Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații "Mihai Viteazul", București, 2015, p. 8.



Making such a model requires interdisciplinary teamwork, “creating a database (especially for the military system n.a.) of ideas from all areas of national security by including experts who held leadership positions”⁸. Preferably, “civil society involvement in strategy development, ... / a more active role in monitoring national security policies”⁹. There is a need for collaboration between institutions, a debate on the project, keeping the experts updated on any change of governance, an integrated architecture, a European dialogue on this issue, as well as its experimentation in order to find optimal variants.

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⁸ <https://la.punkt.ro>, interviu cu Marian Zulean, *Ce este securitatea națională*, accessed 03.05.2019.

⁹ *Ibidem*.



SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-ORGANIZED PROTEST ACTIONS

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Abstract: *In recent years, unauthorized street protests that have taken place in Romania and other EU Member States seem to convey the idea that they are legal and that authorities must obey the claims of protesters of all kinds, regardless of their nature, to the detriment of the law in force. In reality, they often have political connotations, depending on the interests of one or other of the groups they are standing up against. Irrespective of the generating causes, the analysis carried out on these types of manifestations revealed a number of common features.*

Keywords: *communication, dissemination of information, law, public opinion, unauthorized protest, governmental structures.*

Introduction

There were lots of comments made and articles written about the street, unorganized protests, that took place in Romania, especially in mass-media. Many things were said and speculated, for instance regarding #REZIST# movement that appeared in Romania in January 2017.

Yet, phenomena of the same kind, have been happening everywhere in the world lately: in November 2018, the “yellow vests” movement appeared in France¹, in Hungary, there were street actions against the so-called “slavery law”, while in Spain street protests were directed against Pedro Sánchez administration, accused of betraying national interests². In

¹ The “yellow vests” movement appeared in France in the middle of November 2018 (17th November) following the Government’s decision to increase fuel taxes which automatically led to increasing the price paid by citizens in gas-stations.

² Approximately 45,000 people, among whom Mario Vargas Llosa, were present, on Sunday, February 10th, 2019, in the center of Madrid at a meeting against the government where a common statement made by opposition parties was read requiring the Prime Minister to call for elections and firmly asserted that national unity cannot be negotiated just as the rule of law cannot be questioned.



January 2019, almost 22,000 high school students walked the main streets of Switzerland's main cities protesting against the causes leading to climate change. On March 8th, this year, a purple tidal wave made of women marched in Barcelona and Madrid against social inequalities. On the same day, many millions of Algerian people united their voices in the whole country against President Abdel Aziz Buteflika's regime.

An analysis of unorganized protest actions

Our goal in the following lines is to make a profound analysis of these movements in order to identify their characteristics as well as the mechanisms generating and maintaining them, so as the appropriate structures may identify adequate solutions and apply them in order to overcome situations critical to public order generated by this type of social behavior.

Universality. First of all, we should state that the phenomenon of unorganized street protests towards various governmental policies is manifested both in Europe and on other continents³.

They tend to take, everywhere in the world, a way of expressing the voice of part of public opinion regarding certain issues that political forces tend to avoid, or hide from public sight and which they would want to pass unnoticed and undebated by the citizens that have the right to vote as this may result in an unfavorable attitude in the eyes of the electing public.

This does not exclude the possibility that some subjects on the society agenda may also be on the government agenda, but only in order to counter the endeavors made by civil society or provide "arguments" meant to reduce, shape, influence or, if the case may be, annihilate the public will with respect to the manner of solving those issues.

Protest meetings and marches are the most concrete forms of non-electoral behavior. This has been so much consolidated in time that it has become almost natural in states with a consolidated democracy.

From an etymological point of view, to manifest means to be seen and to raise public awareness regarding one's ideals and aims. Participants in unorganized protest movements are dressed using certain dress-codes,

³ See, for instance, the street protests emerging in the USA right after elections were won by President Donald Trump.



clothes are accompanied by certain objects, and sometimes even their bodies are painted. Symbols and images also bring their contribution to the identity dimension of the movement.

Historic character. This type of manifestation of public discontent is not only specific to states suffering from a deficit of democracy, but can happen also in states with consolidated democracies if the government does not manage to understand or is reluctant to cater for the aims of certain social classes or even nations, specific to a certain historic period. For instance, student movements in France, in 1968, were caused by the rigidity of state structures that failed to comprehend and manage the evolutions of society and its current needs. Thus, from historic perspective, these protest movements are not elements of absolute novelty, but they may rather be considered updated „re-runs” of previous ways of manifestation of public discontent towards governmental policies⁴.

Given their historic character, these movements bear the mark of the age when they took place. The way of manifestation of the protest, the slogans used, the aims pursued, the manner of organization and communication, as well as that of promoting leaders and role models, all these are profoundly indebted to the period in which protest movements take place and may be inspired by the evolutions taking place in this regard at world level.

From the organization point of view, a main feature of these protest movements is that they are **“unorganized”**. Thus, they do not take place following the legal provisions made by the state to manage the possible protest manifestations of the population. This does not mean that the actions initiated do not yield a certain degree of organization, or that they are conducted in an anarchical manner. In case of the respective movements there still are one or several de facto, informal leaders who influence, sometimes even from the street, the way events happen. Even if their role is not formalized in any way, the leaders of these movements are more credible and more respected within the movement than the formal leaders of state-created structures.

⁴ The striking fact regarding, for instance, the case of “yellow vests” is that during their first meetings, they referred to the movements in 1968 and 1989, although they lacked concrete common elements with these.



The gradual accumulation of discontent. More often than not, the subjects that trigger these movements do not occur spontaneously, but they are created by the accumulation and intensification in time of states of tension between the governing and the governed people. In the beginning, the divergences between the two sides are of low intensity and, just as it happens with fires, they could be easily put out if the authorities had the capacity to take them into consideration, understand them, realize their significance and try to solve them through a dialogue. Unfortunately, though, these situations are little understood by decision-makers and they become aware of their potential effects only when they become acute and the management of public order is questioned. Only then do they ask the question “how did we end up here”?

For instance, after the events in Bucharest in August 10th, 2018, authorities started to question the validity of Law no. 61/1991 for sanctioning the facts of breaking social norms of public order, whose provisions became applicable in the context of those manifestations. Actually, in 1991, when the law was adopted, Romania had major drawbacks in terms of democracy and the alterations brought to the provisions of the respective law were actually minor “face-liftings” of Decree no. 153 of March 24th, 1970 for establishing and sanctioning misdemeanors regarding social behavior and public order, the new normative act preserving the same philosophy and logic that gave rise to the law in the communist age. The normative act was (and actually still is) obsolete and even an anachronism given the concrete realities of Romanian society.

It should not be ignored that Law no. 61/1991 was adopted before the Constitution and thus, when it was objectively elaborated, it did not take into account constitutional provisions referring to citizens’ rights and obligations. Up to the present, there has been only one line (of art. 8) that has been subject to constitutional control. Actually, it would have been a real necessity that, at least ten years after being adopted (that is, in 2001), a serious assessment of the respective law might have been made and, given the conclusions resulting from applying the normative act, it may have been updated or even replaced.

Another common denominator of these movements is the fact that they generally aim at **blocking certain governmental initiatives.**



Democratic societies and those wishing to accede to this category have invented mechanisms of regulation and vents meant to reduce pressure at the level of society. Certainly, we may ask ourselves why the legal levers of exercising people's will are not used? Of course, there is an answer to this question, too: because they are inefficient as compared to the degree of emergency or intensification of the issue.

The lack of efficiency may occur either because legal procedures were made by governmental structures so as to render them inefficient, namely allowing the government to apply its public policies without being able to explain them openly and in due time, or these procedures lost their efficiency in time as they became obsolete or for reasons having to do with the evolution of society in general or the lack of technical means.

In western democracies, the right to vote is an argument often presented by those opposing street movements. Still, this argument is relatively weak. Life has shown that young people do not care for politics, but they do care for their future. That is why, the result is a global loss of trust from their part in state institutions and they seek other means of expression, in the street. Besides, those who initiate these movements may also initiate actions of boycotting state policies.

Last but not least, the efficiency of legal procedures meant for expressing public opinion on certain public policy is given by the concrete domain in which they would manifest themselves, some of which having an immediate and irreversible effect. For instance, if OUG 13/2017 adopted by the Government, had come into force, its effects would have been irreversible (and favorable) to all the people already convicted, even if one minute after being issued, it would have been revoked.

Psychological impact. From a psychological point of view, governmental initiatives generate within a certain part of society, either directly or on purpose, a feeling of distrust or even rejection. This feeling is actually the essential element ensuring the psychological connection among the supporters of unorganized protest movements. Actually, the analysis of several protest movements has shown that they are not fueled by racist, homophobic or anti-Semitic reasons while participation is made voluntarily, not due to certain political party allegiance.

The feeling of distrust and even the profound resentment felt towards the elites leading our country are psychologically fed due to the manner



considered as lacking transparency or sufficient fairness in which governmental policies are applied. A part of the society feels vulnerable and mistreated by the central authorities and there is but a step from here to a feeling of persecution or even fear of certain plotting schemes made by those having the power to the detriment of those underneath.

Why street protests?

The reason is that the street cannot be shut down like a web page. The banners with slogans, the songs, the pictures, they are all testimonies contributing to the creation of collective memory and supporting virtual platforms. That is why, participation in street movements is understood as a live encounter with history and even as a possibility to influence history.

A serious on-line action made by a group of hackers would have less chances of being considered for real, as this type of action is still not considered usual. It would be difficult to believe that state institutions may consider an IT hacking activity as a claim for collective rights or desiderata.

Moreover, whatever is happening on-line is often associated with young people, while the street reunites all the people, of all ages. When you ponder alone about global warming you may get depressed, but when everyone else who is animated by this subject gets together in the street, they all become more daring. Street movements are thus not only a strategic instrument but also one of encouragement and self-encouragement used by participants.

There is also an anthropological dimension that has to be taken into account: it is not the same for 5,000 people to sign a petition or to make a group in social media as having 5,000 people in the street. Being together brings extra-benefits. An inventory of concrete actions is made, as well as an agenda of the protest movement, all of these being increasingly complex.

The means of communication and the subjects approached.

Behind mobilization for protest actions, there is also a need for a message. Human society has been rapidly evolving and the means of communication and dissemination of information have grown complex and diverse. The participants in such actions now rely on modern means of communication and sharing ideas and information, but in order to make their objectives known, the most important means is the street movement. At present, the most popular means of sharing information is social media that allows both posting opinions and sharing them or sending them to virtual friends and not only. Thus, some people's posts are shared millions



of times⁵. The people who create these posts are interested in creating a certain vision upon the subjects embraced by most internet users pledging on-line their belonging to the protest movements, and also in allowing the popularization of ideas building consensus within the movement. Thus, the militants for protest actions are first reunited in a virtual framework: social platforms, WhatsApp groups or on-line petitions are just as many places for debate and idea-sharing ensuring mobilization for street participation.

If we make an analysis of these posts using the **factual reality perspective** on the facts that were presented, we notice several subjects generating the frustrations that support protest movements. These subjects can be clearly different from each other, but sometimes they overlap and fuel each other. Without being very surprising, the first ones that occur are the mobilization messages and the pictures taken from meetings.

Police brutality (including here the acts of violence committed by the gendarmerie too) quickly become the main subject of posts referring to street protests. After the beginning of protest movements, the groups made on Facebook or other social platforms by protesters talk a lot about brutal repression, unjustified violence, serious wounding. This subject may even become the key one. Behind it, the grand debate issue emerges: the exposure of the movement repression, which is based on real or imaginary facts. In this context, the anti-elite discourse and the precise demands constantly fade in the background.

The use of social networks

An element of interest noticed on social platforms is the fact that some messages could be moderated within the discussion groups or forums made on these platforms, or they were eliminated by the authors or erased by the platform administrators as they broke the rules of use instituted by them.

Through their content, the posts placed on social media platforms mainly send the following messages:

Mobilization: pride and solidarity

There is a very strong feeling of belonging to the cause claimed by the protest movement, which often takes on an idealistic view of the

⁵ For instance, the most popular Facebook post made by the “yellow vests” movement in France had 340 thousand shares. This presents, ironically, a picture of police forces (that was however subject to Facebook censorship).



population. The main part of the most popular posts (those with most visualizations) tends to present the protest movement as having huge dimensions, either in order to re-fuel it sentimentally, or to support and re-launch it. These are usually preceded by messages of organization often rudimentary, such as blocking public squares⁶ or institutions or economic assets, and then followed by appeals to solidarity, launched towards inhabitants⁷, drivers, bikers, unemployed people, or representative figures of the movement⁸.

It should be noted here that if there is an explicit desire to shut down any activity at national level, in general, appealing to violence is not popular at the level of unorganized protest movements; yet, we cannot exclude the attempts made by extremist forces to take advantage of people's participation in order to render their (extremist) ideology known or to leave the impression of the involvement of these movements in acts of violence.

In forums for discussion constituted on social platforms, the protest movements supporters confess, sometimes with a lot of enthusiasm, their feelings of belonging to this corps, the fact that they each of them is animated by the same spirit. Photos taken with various groups, calls for numbers, postings with songs or clips praising the movement, disseminating figures favorable to the movement, pics or clips with protesters abroad doing the same thing as they do, they all illustrate this pride of the movement whose staging largely relies on the iconography of revolutionary instances.

Repression: between true violence and plotting theory

In the logic of participants in unorganized protest movements, the peaceful mass of people has to confront a real "state fortress", which is purposefully created in order to stifle any attempt of voicing discontent, while the reaction of state structures is regarded as identical to that pertaining to any bloody dictatorship. Sometimes, this idea is conveyed through media channels increasingly wishing for sensational news. Anyway, such messages are conveyed on social media platforms in order to create a

⁶ Blocking Victory Square or University Square, for instance.

⁷ "Do not stay inside the house, if you care"!

⁸ X should come.



certain image of the methods used by government forces so as to keep the protest movement under control.

Obviously, the participants in protest movements consider unjustified the actions made by the police and the other law-enforcing forces. The representatives of the movement explain any act of violence of the mob as non-specific to the peaceful character of the meetings and resulting from conspiracy theories. The damage brought to public assets is explained through the participation in the manifestation of policemen disguised as hooligans with the specific purpose of discrediting the protest movement⁹, a theory which was not proved by evidence (but which could not have been proved as such at all). As for the fact that the number of protesters is decreasing, the representatives of the movement often state that this situation is due to the obstacles installed by authorities on the routes of passage towards the assembly points.

The pics from the first meetings of protest movements are presented in parallel with massive postings with pics and clips showing participants with bruised faces, elderly women knocked down by the police, or participants being hit completely without reason by law-enforcement forces.

After the first actions, the on-line supporters of protest movements find justifications for the fact that the number of street participants has decreased: they argue that this is the result of the large number of participants who were wounded or killed or at least unjustly beaten by police forces. Actually, it is always difficult and debatable to comment on the various clips as they are usually quite short, extracted from complex evolutions of facts, when they are not mere standard depictions of wounded protesters, often taken post factum. On the whole, it is still necessary to admit that the images uploaded on the internet seem authentic, but they cannot always be verified. When they were verified, however, the conclusion was that the large majority of clips and pictures that were the most disseminated on-line are genuine and were taken on the specific occasions of those demonstrations.

⁹ Regarding the cars set aflame by the “yellow vest” movement in France, their supporters state that most of the time they were old vehicles, withdrawn from circulation, without registration plates.



There is, still, an exception: the clips compiling instances of police brutality, in which, in order to increase their emotional impact, some images are taken from other protest actions.

The abundance of samples of police brutality fuel a feeling of mistreatment, injustice, and persecution, clearly shown in comments. Close pics are taken in order to present supporters of protest movements being hit and taken by surprise by the police. Without presenting information on the context, there are numberless instances showing a picture of a young man – apparently not connected to the protest movement – with a blood-covered face being questioned by the police. All these images are meant to discredit law-enforcement forces in the eyes of protesters.

Thus, the field is prepared for passing on over a new threshold: the tidal wave of irritation rises to outrage when faced with even tougher images, for instance those taken from a clip presenting a young man being brutally hit by police forces apparently without exercising any act of violence and, on the contrary, seeming ready to “surrender” by raising his arms¹⁰. Or the clips presenting people with broken arcades and bruised faces after having been methodically beaten by police forces¹¹. Such images often shock the audience, instilling feelings of outrage, emotion, and solidarity.

A new stage is then initiated, even more shocking and terrible, that of the victims of tear-gas grenades. These are non-lethal weapons using projectiles conceived for deterring the mob, but they may cause serious wounds upon impact with a live target. These images, very often extremely emotional and therefore very hard to stop, are launched even without a clear context. Thus, images are shared with a 70-year-old granny who is the victim of such a projectile and is surrounded by assault forces, clips of a street vendor who indignantly testifies to seeing a man “with open wounds” or of a woman asking witnesses to say something about another woman who had to undergo surgery after being hit straight in the face with such projectiles.

On the contrary, the looters and vandals or those who act violently against police forces are never presented in social media or, if they are caught in this kind of acts, they are defended with all sorts of conspiracy

¹⁰ Such images were posted, for instance, after the 10th of August 2018 protest movement in Bucharest.

¹¹ This is what happens in France during the protests organized by the “yellow vests”.



theories, discrediting the respective images and accusing the authorities of scenarios involving fake vandals, fake cars aflame etc., thus exonerating the members and supporters of protest movements of any moral responsibility.

Faced with whatever they consider as an abuse made by law-enforcement forces, those who adhere to protest movements send off two kinds of messages: some that praise the use of violent means and some suggesting adopting pacifist methods in defense against state forces. Sometimes, in social media, we may even find high appraisals of the participants to protest movements, some characters being even considered as “martyrs¹²”.

Elite criticism: certain categories of elected people are targeted

Within the on-line environment, the social-media posts on social networks of those involved in unorganized protest movements create two virtual sides: there are – on one side – the protesters, and, on the other side, the rich, the elected, certain mass-media individuals for whom the members of this community have strong feelings of resentment. It is often the case that a certain personality concentrates the antipathy of the entire protest movement and is targeted with virulent criticism and fake news, some of which really gross. This character becomes the target for all kinds of allegations that he/she is apparently guilty of: exercising absolute power, disastrous economic policies, the rise in fuel prices etc. and for all these he/she is asked to resign.

Practically all the elected people may be targeted, as well as the people to be found in leadership positions at all levels of governmental structures. They are considered to be too well-paid, not active enough, disconnected from the real world. Some of these claims are based on facts – such as the benefits given to Parliament members; others are false – such as those saying that the Parliament members in one country are better paid than their counterparts in other states. Last but not least, certain allegations are solely based on pure speculations, fueled more or less purposefully by certain mass-media entities.

¹² In this respect we can bring as an argument the well-known case of French boxer Christophe Dettinger, accused of hitting policemen during the eighth episode of “yellow vests” protests in Paris, presented in social media as a hero defending vulnerable peaceful protesters.



Mass media are also prone to criticism, starting from the on-line broadcasting stations that are accused of manipulating numbers or images.

In turn, certain news channels on-line put forth the acts of vandalism sometimes even suggesting the existence of real urban guerilla. The damage caused is much inflated in comparison to the images depicting police brutality, underlining the shift between the social network groups and the respective news rooms.

In other cases, there are on-line written media willing to satirize imaginary preoccupations of country leaders, some suggesting that the measures taken by governmental authorities would only be meant to postpone making a certain decision envisaged by the protest movement up to a stage in which protesters would be more likely to give in (for instance during summer holidays).

Conclusions

Synthetizing the main ideas of the analysis we have made, we may conclude that:

- generally speaking, the act of governance cannot fully satisfy all social categories;
- neglecting the issues of part of the population may generate protest movements that, in turn, may tend to ignore the rules of conduct imposed by the state authorities;
- even in the digital era, protest movements are a form of venting the dissatisfaction manifest by part of the public opinion and the best means of making itself understood;
- although unorganized, these protest movements are in reality well-managed and their leaders, actual influencers, are only informal ones;
- the adherence to these movements is facilitated by the Internet and by the modern means of communication which ensure the setting and dissemination of ideas and aims of the respective movement;
- law-enforcing forces are demonized and presented by protesters as a source of all the evils in our society.

In our opinion, the unorganized protest actions generate instability and disturb public order, therefore requiring state authorities with responsibilities in the field to find optimal solutions, first of all in order to prevent such manifestations and, in case they do happen, to be able to



exercise a certain control over them so as protests might not degenerate in violent acts that produce damage or even the loss of human lives.

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE FOR ENSURING AND RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER

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***Abstract:** This article addresses aspects regarding the use of force from the perspective of legality, proportionality and necessity in the dynamics of the uninterrupted use of force, within which the respect for fundamental human rights is a major requirement. The critical issue for law enforcement is to assess the use of force, whether the level of force was objectively reasonable, taking into account all the circumstances the gendarme faces at the place of action and whether the use of force was the only option. The present issue is less addressed in the Romanian literature; thus, the tactical action of ensuring public order during public meetings needs to acquire profound legal valences from the perspective of respecting the right of assembly. When the situation requires it, the use of force must be reasonably justified depending on the overall circumstances of the incident. De-escalation of violence passive or active - is achieved by mastering skills in the tactical communication, in dialogue and negotiation, embedded in the continuum use of force that ensures the safety of the participants in the protest as well as the safety of the gendarmes.*

***Key words:** violence, reasonable force, law enforcement, human rights.*

The specific actions executed by the Romanian Gendarmerie forces for maintaining and re-enforcing the public order on the 10th of August 2018 raised a lot of interest in the public debate arena, since they predominantly and allegedly were portrayed as “Gendarmerie aggressiveness”, “Gendarmerie abuses”, “unbridled violence”, “unbelievable violence”, “brutal intervention”, “extreme violence” etc. Concerning these allegations, we do believe that it is necessary to make a more profound and more extended analysis for understanding the way of development and manifestation of a public demonstration and the subsequent actions of the public order enforcement forces in their entire complexity.

The situations in which the public order enforcement forces intervene for assuring public order during the public meetings are



emotionally charged and in their majority can create a conflict situation between the protesters and the public order enforcement forces. This conflicting nature is also determined by the way in which the public order enforcement forces use force, and when the force used is excessive, the situation itself is uselessly degraded and escalated and has effects over the subsequent actions. Even though in Romania, as in any other democratic system, there has been created a legal framework regarding the right of public gathering and convening, during the public meetings and manifestations violence has still occurred. Even if the objective of the legislation focused on the domain of public assemblies is to maintain the public order, we believe nonetheless that there is an acute need of adopting a new model of action (intervention) as a direct response in such situations, in accordance with those specific standards concerning the level of force that must be used. This comes directly from the use of force continuum in which the dialogue, the communication with the protesters are defined as a primary tactical option of the public order enforcement forces. In this context, we keep in mind that such a way of manifestation represents or can represent a legitimate dimension of the democratic process that imposes the necessity to reconsider the way of approaching the public manifestations and especially the spontaneous protest actions.

In this endeavor we take into considerations the legal provisions of the current legislation concerning the issue of maintaining and re-enforcing public order, which emphasizes the use of force by the Gendarmerie units, as follows:

- *“...they will intervene for preventing or neutralizing those manifestations which severely disturb the public order....”*¹;

- *“....public order enforcement entities will intervene by using, in accordance with the legal provisions and in relation with the situations created, their organic technical means”*²;

- *“The intervention in force of the order enforcement entities will be decided....”*³;

¹ Art. 17, Legea nr. 60/1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186, 29 septembrie 2004.

² Art. 18, Legea nr. 60/1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186, 29 septembrie 2004.



- *“The use of organic technical means will be performed...”⁴;*
- *“...We will use force”....., „force will be used”....., „using the means of preventing or constraining/coercing”⁵;*
- *“...to use force, the organic means and weapons, in accordance with the legal provisions”⁶;*
- *“...it uses the organic weapons with their specific ammunition, bulletproof vests, protection shields, protection helmets, rubber batons, electrostatic batons, irritant spraying devices, white weapons, water cannons, rubber bullet guns, handcuffs, service horses and dogs, sound and light signaling devices, armored means, engineer means and works, as well as any organic protection and immobilization means,....”⁷;*
- *“for preventing and neutralizing the aggressive actions of the people seriously disturbing public order, actions that cannot be overcome or annihilated by using other legal means”⁸;*
- *“The use of the designated means (...) is approached gradually and must not exceed the real needs for immobilization of the turbulent or aggressive persons or for neutralization of the illegal actions and will be stopped immediately after the mission objective is achieved.”⁹;*
- *“In force intervention is ordered”¹⁰;*

³ Art. 19, Legea nr. 60/1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186 din 29 septembrie 2004.

⁴ Art. 20, Legea nr. 60/1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186 din 29 septembrie 2004.

⁵ Art. 22, Legea nr. 60/1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186 din 29 septembrie 2004, art. 32, alin (2),(3), Legea nr. 550/2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

⁶ Art. 20, Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

⁷ Art. 29, Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

⁸ Art. 29, lit. a), Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

⁹ Art. 33, Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

¹⁰ Art. 34, aln. (1), Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.



- *“For achieving their duty tasks, the Romanian Gendarmerie personnel have the obligation to respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms and to give first aid to those persons in need as a result of forced intervention”¹¹.*

Although, juridical speaking, the public gatherings, as they are legally defined, can be organized only after statements are being made in advance, in reality we are confronted with the so-called spontaneous gatherings or spontaneous protests which cannot be banned, case in which the public order enforcement forces have to adopt a *facilitating response*, which means that they have to ensure their development. Also by law¹² there is a ban on those public gatherings used as a vehicle of: “a) propagation of totalitarian fascist ideas, communist ideas, racist ideas or the ideas of any other terrorist-diversionist organizations; b) organization of an coup d’état or any other action against national security; c) violation of the public order, security or morality, of the citizen rights and liberties or jeopardizing the health of citizens”. In our opinion, despite the fact that the specialized legislation covers in a general framework the use of force, there is a need for an integrated approach of the elements involved in maintaining public order and implicitly of its subsequent action of reinforcing the public order (intervention) that eventually is going to configure and formalize a national model of action. Such a model is influenced by economic, social, cultural, juridical, political factors which determine its various forms, customized by the national specificity. By approaching the new generation protests from the perspective of legality and legitimacy, we consider that the implementation of the use of force must become a last-resort tactical measure adopted only when the other non-violent and successive tactical options have proved inefficient.

Upon a first assessment of legal provisions related to the use of force, we may conclude that they are quite general and therefore may generate lack of functionality in the integrated management of a public meeting. In reality, there is a need for an innovative approach also from the legal perspective of such an action in order to ensure public order. Thus, we can estimate that the

¹¹ Art. 37, Legea nr. 550 din 29 noiembrie 2004 privind organizarea și funcționarea Jandarmeriei Române, Monitorul Oficial nr. 1175, 13 decembrie 2004.

¹² Art. 9, Legea nr. 60 din 1991 privind organizarea și desfășurarea adunărilor publice, republicată, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 186, 29 septembrie 2004.



tactical dimension of an action in this field is no longer singular; it acquires profound juridical, psychological, information and communicational valences holding as main concern the respect for human rights.

In order to clarify aspects related to the use of force – whether it can be considered necessary, minimal, excessive, or proportional, we need to take into account the fact that, according to the law, in order to accomplish its missions, the gendarmerie is vested with the exercise of public authority and “the image of authority is perceived as a public, constraining force”¹³. It is obvious that the law refers to legal responsibilities, and in order to accomplish those, there is a need for reconfiguration of the forms of action, which implies, in turn, action procedures, specific techniques and tactics meant to reach a target, to accomplish a task, taking into consideration the circumstances of each action, which is essentially unique, especially when force is used.

Every time when force is used, controversial issues are created regarding options, opportunities and levels of force. Under these circumstances it becomes essential to integrate the dimensions of an intervention action – tactical, juridical, psychological, information-related and communicational as “situations may be similar or may be reflecting each other without actually having complete identity”¹⁴. The issue of the use of force is a basic one in applying the law as within the dynamics of an action it is fundamental to know when and how much force should be used and whether other options were identified to have been applied without the expected effect.

Vesting the military personnel of the gendarmerie with the exercise of public authority, in other words with the application of law, implies prevention, deterrence, neutralization, disruption, settlement etc. of certain conflicting situations or with conflicting potential that affect the public order climate. In other words, they have the capacity to turn a critical situation into one that may be easier to manage. At the same time, “the use of force is a critical issue in any society that has many different points of view regarding it. On the one hand, society needs order and security which

¹³ N. Popa, M.-C. Eremia, D.-M. Dragnea, *Teoria generală a dreptului. Sinteză pentru seminar*, Editura All Beck, 2005, p. 72.

¹⁴ <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/criminology/police-and-the-use-of-force-policies-criminology-essay.php>, accessed on 21.02.2019.



are obtained by applying the law, on the other hand the application of law is often made through the use of reasonable physical force or the threat to use physical force when certain situations occur”¹⁵. Given the aspects presented above “the use of force is the last option, it is a necessary course of action to take in order to re-establish security when other practices are inefficient”¹⁶ in which force can be defined as “that amount of effort necessary for determining the compliance of a subject”¹⁷. Thus, physical force is a direct physical contact (by using hands, feet, body), actually implying the contact with the subject or by making use of protection and intervention means that has to be objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional. When the means of protection and intervention are used, the force can involve mechanical or electrical means (e.g. the Taser), including chemical substances (tear gas, pepper spray, CS¹⁸), other than fire weapons.

Given the aspects described above, before resorting to force, through taking into consideration the principles of action, the good practices in the application of law and the uninterrupted use of force, it is necessary to take into account, according to the circumstances, also the constructive authority resulting from combining institutional power, situational power, relative power, and personal power that the gendarme has to use. Communication skills are needed here in order to obtain observance, compliance and control of a subject that opposes resistance. De-escalation of passive or active violence is performed through mastering the abilities in tactical communication, in dialogue and negotiation, integrated in the uninterrupted use of force that ensures both the safety of protesters and the gendarmes’ safety. The outcome is the need of developing a culture of applying the law through which other options may be identified instead the instrumental exercising of authority. Such options reflect the operationalization of public

¹⁵ Avdija Avdi S., *Police Use of Force: An Analysis of Factors that Affect Police Officer’s Decision to Use Force on Suspects*, International Research Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 2(9), 1-6, September (2013).

¹⁶ <https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx>, accessed on 23.02.2019.

¹⁷ *Police Use of Force in America, 2001*, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001, p. 1.

¹⁸ Chlorobenzalmalononitrile, invented in 1928 by American chemists americani Ben B. Carson și Roger W. Stoughton. The name CS comes from the initials of their names C (Carson) and S (Stoughton).



order model regarding the use of force in which dialogue is the main tactical option in projecting security, reducing disputes, verbal and physical violence. Given the adoption of standards for the application of law in the domain of public gatherings, the subjective nature of the standards of law enforcement (by making use of force) has become even more complex as “the reasonable character of the force used has to be judged from the perspective of a reasonable agent at the scene and in the moment of the incident, while any interpretation of reasonability has to take into consideration the fact that personnel often has to make decisions in only a few seconds in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving with respect to the quantity of force necessary in a specific situation.”¹⁹

Yet, the major issue is the assessment of the use of force, if the level of force has been objectively reasonable, taking into account all the circumstances the gendarme is confronted with on the spot. The level of force or the amount of force used cannot be precisely measured while being reasonable or not cannot be precisely defined; nor can these principles be applied mechanically. According to the dictionary, by *reasonable* we understand a fact or an action that “is maintained within normal, usual limits, without exaggerations, balanced”²⁰. Given these theoretical as well as practical arguments, the conclusion is that resorting to the use of force has to be the final option; yet, in these conditions too, force has to answer the principles of reasonability, proportionality, necessity, gradual application.

In order to be able to say that the force used was excessive, we need to take into consideration what is understood by “excessive”, hence the “further complication of judging the excessive level of force whose consequences depend on the available information, the criteria used and the manner in which they are applied”²¹. The need to know and abide by the principles in the use of force becomes vital, thus resulting in “two imperative conditions governing its application: necessity and proportionality and any use of force that is unnecessary or disproportionate

¹⁹ Kamala D. Harris, *Law Enforcement Policy & Procedures Manual*, California Department of Justice, March 2015, pp. 33-34.

²⁰ Dicționar Enciclopedic, ediția a V-a, Editura Cartier, 2004, p. 804.

²¹ *Use of Force by Police. Overview of National and Local Data*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1999, p. 62.



would constitute illegal violence”²². The fulfilling of responsibilities under the circumstances of the situation created cannot be performed without resorting to a certain “quantity of force” in the circumstances of the incident. The circumstances of an incident that presupposes the use of force are not limited, they are modified from one incident to another and the use of force is almost always at the border between legitimacy and illegality. When we refer to legitimacy, we keep in mind the necessity and proportionality of force, the fact that the state holds the monopoly of legitimate violence and that “the justification of state authority is also based on the confidence that the state inspires to its citizens or on the fear inspired by the constraint that the state may exercise, being the only one entitled to legitimate violence”²³.

Before resorting to force against a subject, recommendations, warnings, orders, commands can, most of the time result in the subjects’ compliance. Regarding issues of illegality, we should state here that any useless, excessive, disproportionate use of force may be regarded as illegal violence that, obviously, should attract disciplinary measures or even criminal law consequences. Due to these reasons, we consider that the gendarmerie, just as the police, are vested with the exercise of public authority as public “instruments” that express the legitimacy of the state in the use of violence and actually represents a privilege as well as the responsibility through which the use of force is validated. Such lacks of balance seriously affect the reciprocation of rights and obligations between the rule of law and the citizen.

In order for the application of force, by taking into consideration the whole circumstances of an incident, to be necessary, gradual, and proportional, it has to be assessed through a series of indicators regarding the behavior of the subject against whom force is used, the legitimate object to be protected, the characteristic features of the subject against whom force is used, the force ratio, the protection ratio, the risk of collateral damage, the security of the subject and the gendarme, etc. Furthermore, we need to also consider the existence of other means and, implicitly, other options, among

²²Aline Daillère, *L’ordre et la force enquête sur l’usage de la force par les représentants de la loi en France*, Acat, p. 9.

²³ Gheorghe Iancu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice*, Editura Universul Juridic, 2015, p. 398.



which the gendarme's capacity to exercise control and self-control; his/ her capacity and abilities to influence the subject are vital as they open up multiple variants for ensuring the compliance of the subject. Control also implies gendarme self-control; otherwise, the response (*which is rational*) turns into a reaction (*which is emotional*) such as hostility and aggressiveness. The use of force is considered as necessary and acceptable if it is objectively reasonable through the entire amount of incident circumstances and legal standards and it is reasonable appreciated also by other reasonable people. Practice shows that incidents that presuppose the use of force are tense, dynamic, uncertain, involving decision-making in extremely small time intervals and therefore confirm and demand the need to resort to dialogue tactics and techniques. The conclusion that comes off is that the responsibilities of gendarmerie in the domain of ensuring and re-establishing public order are part of law-enforcement and the professional training of gendarmes needs to reflect this requirement, taking into consideration that practice outlines new demands in their training process. In this regard, we are also taking into consideration the UN juridical provisions, according to which gendarmes can also be assimilated to the law enforcement officials. Thus, the "term *law-enforcement officials* includes all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention"²⁴ while "in countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by state security services, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services"²⁵. In this context, gendarmes can also be considered as "state-appointed authorities"²⁶ and, just as the Police, the Gendarmerie has the obligation to respect and protect human rights. With respect to the right to peaceful assembly, it may be considered that when "acting without justifiable legal grounds or without a legitimate purpose or if it does not respect the principle of necessity and proportionality, (...), [the gendarme]

²⁴ Art. 1, comment a), Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UN General Assembly Resolution, no 34/169, 17 December 1979.

²⁵ Art. 1, comment b), Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UN General Assembly Resolution, no 34/169, 17 December 1979.

²⁶ Formare pentru polițiști din perspectiva drepturilor fundamentale. Manual pentru formatorii polițiștilor, Agenția pentru Drepturi Fundamentale a Uniunii Europene (FRA), Oficiul pentru Publicații al Uniunii Europene, 2018, p. 31.



violates the right to freedom”²⁷, in the present case, the person’s right to peaceful assembly. Thus, it becomes compulsory *to respect* the person’s right to peaceful assembly which means that no assembly can be banned without appropriate justification and excessive force will not be used. Regarding the duty of gendarmes to *safeguard* the right to peaceful assembly, there is a need of reconsidering the tactics of ensuring public order in order to protect those protesters who manifest peacefully, to facilitate protest and, implicitly, to use force in a different manner. The employment of force must not be subjective and arbitrary, it should be circumscribed to the entire spectrum of circumstances, to answer the demand of necessity, but only after resorting to other options that are available and reasonable. In these conditions, we need to look after a legitimate objective to protect but only by resorting to minimal, necessary, and reasonable force during all the phases of the incident.

Given the aspects mentioned above, practice in law enforcement shows a certain continuum of force employment that is manifest from the mere presence of the gendarme to the concrete use of force, according to legal provisions. Thus, the mere presence has to impose authority, tactical communication (verbalization) with the respective subject, hands control (physical contact for body check-up, immobilization, leading etc.), the use of non-lethal protection and intervention means – the intermediate force level, the physical force when it is necessary to overcome the resistance force of a subject, the mechanical force by using certain means, other than the weapons. Still, it should be noted that in case the gendarme is perceived as a potential target, a certain subject may capitalize on the situation to his advantage. The image sent by the gendarme, his/her aspect and behavior while dressed in uniform, become primary factors in public perception, especially when previous actions are taken into consideration. Tactical communication made by resorting to elements of the force for dialogue does not imply only their presence in the layout of the action forces deployed, but especially acquiring and mastering communication skills for ensuring the compliance of violent protesters. Tactical communication thus acquires added value, it confers legitimacy and acknowledgement of the role of law-

²⁷ Formare pentru polițiști din perspectiva drepturilor fundamentale. Manual pentru formatorii polițiștilor, Agenția pentru Drepturi Fundamentale a Uniunii Europene (FRA), Oficiul pentru Publicații al Uniunii Europene, 2018, p. 31.



enforcement forces, the confidence of society if it is part of pre-event and post-event communication. Such an approach results in avoidance of tactical and legal unjustified situations.

When the law-enforcement forces' interventions are not appropriate for the circumstances, they may turn protests into real riots, as an explosion of repressed fury against those but, at the same time, also as the expression of general social frustration. We have to underline the fact that the right to protest does not imply violent behavior as such and, therefore, this cannot be accepted as a legitimate form of protest; yet, violence can be reduced, controlled, through particularizing and nuancing the dimensions of ensuring public order actions as well as of flexible application of force employment continuum focused on tactical communication.

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TENDINȚE ALE TRAFICULUI DE COCAINĂ LA NIVELUL ROMÂNIEI

TRENDS OF COCAINE TRAFFICKING AT THE LEVEL OF ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The article makes a brief analysis of the situation of the cocaine trafficking situation in Romania in 2019, especially given the situation of EU membership and being a state with a significant external border of the EU. Recent captures in the maritime border area are a concern both for public opinion, but especially for law enforcement institutions in the field of drug trafficking. An oscillating situation of cocaine captures is observed in Romania, which leads us to conclude that in the last period of time it has become a place that criminal groups seek as cocaine trafficking passages, especially from Europe to Turkey. Through this brief study, we draw the attention of those concerned to the danger that the drug market in Romania will grow in the field of cocaine and crack. At the level of consumption, we can say that the percentage of cocaine and crack consuming population is small. This is also due to the high price of cocaine. It is necessary to increase the cooperation activities in the maritime border between the bodies involved in the field of countering cocaine trafficking.*

Keywords: *cocaine, crack, EU border, drug market, organized crime groups, drug capture, drug users.*

Introduction

Drug trafficking is steadily increasing in the Black Sea area, namely Romania. Over the past two years, this scourge has become more and more present in our lives, at the moment through the activities of capturing quantities of drugs, most of which, in terms of quantity, being the natural drugs. The danger is growing also due to the increase in the number of consumers in our country.

The analysis of trends is based on the EMCDDA and ANA reports in recent years. For the analysis made in the article I also used open source.



The identification of trends in drug trafficking and consumption poses both practical and methodological problems due to the lack of data necessary to analyze the objectives of the phenomenon.

1. Romania: drug trafficking and consumption – realities and trends

The idea of this article came after the significant media broadcasting of Black Sea cocaine captures in April 2019. We know very well that this drug is produced in South American countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, due to the fact that the coca bush grows only in the Andes Mountains.

We have been spectators to this phenomenon since 1993, when the DEA (US Anti-Drug Department) took significant measures against two clans in Colombia, namely Medellin and Cali, and we could only shiver at the thought of the existence of such organizations, but especially of the value of the money made by one of the greatest lords of cocaine, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria (born December 1, 1949 – dead December 2, 1993). This drug lord had a known net wealth estimated at 30 billion dollars (in the 1990s) and about 100 billion dollars if we include also the money hidden in various locations in Colombia¹.

It was only the beginning, because in 2017, the President of Colombia boasted about a 12-tonne cocaine catch, the largest drug capture in the history of this country worth 360 billion dollars (after the calculation of the Colombian police). It is also worth mentioning the results of captures made in the year 2016, 317 tons, and in 2017 a quantity of 362 tons of cocaine. These quantities are part of the production of cocaine in Colombia.

At a simple comparison, we are getting to know the exorbitant amounts of money that have grown from year to year, just talking about drug captures. The question is: what is the real quantity of cocaine on the black market in a year. Or, *which is the amount of cocaine that reaches the European black market?*

The cocaine capture on the Black Sea shore, on the border of Romania, the European border of 2019, awakens us to a cruel reality. What is the amount of cocaine that has passed through Romania? What is the

¹ https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pablo_Escobar.



amount of cocaine that fueled the Romanian black market? There are also questions that we instantly ask ourselves at first reading or watching news.

The security of the Black Sea border is somewhat precarious or we have activity gaps... We assert permanently that the EU's external border security provided by Romania is one of the best. It is a truthful statement, but what is really happening in this area, as well as the way in which public order services and not only do their duty, are real problems to see.

A few years before Romania's accession to the EU, those who had clandestine drug-producing laboratories and those who had deposits, especially in Bulgaria, tried to change their place to Romania. In 2005-2007, Romania faced problems related to these changes of location based as arguments on a simple rumor that Bulgaria is not accepted in the EU. This rumor was shaken by the entry of Bulgaria into the EU space together with Romania and the institutions in charge annihilated several clandestine laboratories and everything returned to normal.

It was found, as the UNODC World Drug Report for 2018 shows, that the quantity of cocaine captured globally has increased by 23% compared to the previous year, possibly reaching 1129 tons by 2029.

2. Cocaine market in Europe and Romania

Europe is the second largest cocaine market with an estimated retail market with an annual value of at least EUR 5.7 billion². However, the findings of the UNODC World Report on Drugs for 2018 show that the majority of cocaine captures in 2016 took place outside these two main markets for cocaine (North America and Europe), **confirming the widely spread cocaine trafficking to emerging markets and proliferation of trafficking routes around the globe.**

Currently, no cocaine market in Romania has been identified, as is also apparent from the National Drug Report of 2018, which states: "*Trend differences can be explained by the renewed interest in new psychoactive substances but also by the evolution of cannabis consumption, which,*

² *European Drug Report. Trends and developments 2019*, European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).



although having the smallest values in Europe, continues its upward trend”³.

The report states that the main drug consumed at national level is cannabis. Since 2010, the “new psychoactive substances” (NSP) market has been stabilized thanks to firm and prompt measures. Of the stimulant class, “cocaine is most consumed and ecstasy is the most confiscated stimulant drug”⁴.

In the case of cocaine, several indicators are currently showing increasing trends⁵.




Chart no. 1. The distribution of cannabis-related medical emergencies depending on the drug used in combination with it. Source: ANA.

From the above situation, we notice that cocaine use at national level is at the bottom of the ranking. More specifically, it is clear that we have an incipient cocaine market in progress, this is also due to the high price of this drug.

Cocaine / crack consumption is especially specific to young adults (15-34 years) who have experienced 1% cocaine / crack consumption, 0.2% consumed some in the last year, so that in the last month the consumption of these substances was only recorded for the population aged between 35 and 64 (0.1%)⁶.

³ National Report (Romania) on the drug situation. New developments and trends, 2018, the National Anti-drug Agency (ANA), p. 31.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 32.

⁵ European Drug Report. Trends and developments 2019, European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), p. 11.

⁶ National Report (Romania) on the drug situation. New developments and trends, 2018, the National Anti-drug Agency (ANA), p. 44.



After a growth period commenced in 2010, in 2016 there is a stabilization of the prevalence of cocaine / crack consumption over consumers' lifetime and during the last year to the level identified in the previous study (2013), but there is a recovery in consumption of these stimulant substances⁷.

Among the drugs identified on the illicit market, cocaine still holds the highest price (90000 Euro / kg)⁸.

Droguri pentru bogați			Droguri pentru săraci		
Drog	Cantitate	Preț	Drog	Cantitate	Preț
Cocaina	1 gram	100-130 de euro	Heroină	1 gram	20-40 de euro
LSD	1 timbru	20-30 de euro	Heroină	1 bilă	6-12 euro
Ecstasy	1 pastilă	10-20 de euro	Metadona	1 pastilă	1 euro
Mescalină de cactus	1 cub	25-60 de euro	Marijuana	1 gram	10-12 euro
Ciuperci halucinogene	1 gram	40-70 de euro	Hașiș	1 gram	7-12 euro
Opium	1 gram	60-80 de euro	Ulei de canabis	1 gram	15 euro

Table no. 1. The cost of drugs in Romania. Source: <https://www.libertatea.ro/>




Chart no. 2. Characteristics of cocaine / crack consumption in the general population. Source: ANA.

⁷ National Report (Romania) on the drug situation. New developments and trends, 2018, the National Anti-drug Agency (ANA), p. 43.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 221.



3. The situation of cocaine consumption at the level of Romania

Cocaine use, according to ANA statistics for 2108, is 0.1% for the age of 35-64-year-old people, which is generally low.

About the cocaine market in Romania, we can say that it is fluctuating, so in 2016 we had captures of 2321,8 kg and in 2017 only 8,176 kg and the leaves of coke from 0,497 kg in 2016 to 0,240 in 2017. In comparison to this catch in 2019 of 980 kg are small quantities, which is why we are showing the interest of criminal groups for trafficking cocaine through Romania coming to the Black Sea, then to the West. The captures amount to 300 million euros.

At the global level, the implications of cocaine use for public health are difficult to measure, because long-term health hazards are difficult to monitor and often may not be recognized. However, it is expected that problems will worsen if the prevalence of consumption, especially high-risk drugs, increases. It is noted that there is a slight increase in the number of people admitted for the first time to specialized cocaine rehab programs for consumers.

An alarming trend, though still rare, is the increase in crack cocaine use, with fears that it may start to affect several countries. In general, we still need to better understand what constitutes effective treatment for cocaine users, including the best way to respond to cocaine-related problems that may co-exist with opioid addiction⁹.

4. Cocaine captures, important instrument of current state

At the street level, the situation of cocaine captures is not worrying, we can say; thus, in 2017:

“Cocaine - 169 captures, totaling 8.176 kg of which:

- *Quantities below 5 grams / capture: 130 catches, totaling 136.09 grams (1.04 grams / capture);*
- *Quantities ranging from 5 grams / capture to 1,000 grams / capture: 36 captures, totaling 3194.54 grams;*
- *Quantities over 1,000 grams/capture: 3 captures totaling 4.8458 kg”¹⁰.*

⁹ *Recent changes in Europe's cocaine market*, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2018, p. 5.

¹⁰ *National Report (Romania) on the drug situation. New developments and trends, 2018*, the National Anti-drug Agency (ANA), p. 197.




Chart no. 3. Situation of the quantities of confiscated drugs decreasing in 2017 as compared to 2016 Source: *The Directorate for Combating Organized Crime - General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police, the National Anti-Drug Agency.*

“Although the confiscated quantity has known a significant decrease, **the number of cocaine captures** continues the **upward** trend, in the year 2017 being 169 captures. **89.11%** (7.286 kg) of the total amount of confiscated cocaine comes from **9 significant captures**, of which 3 captures (2.587 kg) had as destination Romania. The amount of 0.89 kg of cocaine was the result of 160 captures”¹¹.

In comparison to cannabis, the number of actions completed with drug confiscation is very low, so we have 3292 captures against 162 captures of cocaine.

From official sources, ANA and EMCDDA, the cocaine trafficking route was from South America through the Atlantic Ocean and then through Spain, Portugal, France to the market. Practically this capture shows us a new strategy of criminals in dealing with cocaine trafficking. It is known that “most of the cocaine has entered Europe through the Iberian Peninsula”¹².

“The large captures made recently in areas other than traditional ones suggest that the relative importance of this route may have diminished a bit, with traffickers bringing more and more cocaine into Europe and large ports where containers are being discharged. In this respect, it is

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 200.

¹² *Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market*, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2018, p. 5.



worth mentioning that in 2016 Belgium became the country with the largest volume of cocaine captured, surpassing Spain in this ranking”¹³.

The capture of 79 kilos of coca paste in Spain and another 7 kilos in Italy in 2016 suggests the existence of **illegal laboratories** producing cocaine hydrochloride **in Europe**. This new element indicates a change in the production tactics of certain criminal organizations, with most cocaine laboratories discovered in Europe in the past as “*secondary extraction units*” where cocaine was recovered from the materials in which it was incorporated (e.g. wines, clothing, plastic articles).

Harta 7 - 4: Rute de traficare a cocainei în anul 2017



Sursa: Direcția de Combatere a Criminalității Organizate – Inspectoratul General al Poliției Române, Agenția Națională Antidrog

The analysis of the last 10 years reveals a fluctuating trend in the evolution of drug-related captures, with maximum **cocaine** levels in 2016, **heroin** and **narcotic drugs** in 2015, **opium** in 2012 and **NSP** in 2010.

The year 2016 was one year with a serious yield of cocaine captures in Europe, about 98,000 cocaine captures, reaching 70.9 tons. Compared to the previous year, a slight increase in cocaine trafficking in Europe can be seen.

Significant increases have been noticed in the countries of the South-Eastern and Baltic regions of the European Union. Between 2014 and 2016, Romania reported a 70-fold increase in captured cocaine (2,3 tons in 2016),

¹³ *Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market*, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2018, p. 5.



Poland reported a 15-fold increase (0.4 tons in 2016), Bulgaria, Cyprus, five times higher, and Turkey reported more than twice the amount captured during this period.

5. Factors influencing the increase in cocaine trafficking

Western countries remain, however, the primary destination countries for wholesale cocaine trafficking.

The European drug market seems to be showing an increase in the availability of high purity cocaine. Consequently, the incentive for being chosen by many drug users, which has recently been simply sold at variable prices, has now become affordable, with high levels of purity.

The main factors underpinning this increase in cocaine supply include a steady increase in coca production in source countries since 2014. At present, an increasing number of European and non-European organized crime groups are directly involved in the cocaine trade between source countries and the consumer market. New traffic routes are emerging or are of major importance, e.g. routes through overseas territories near source countries (e.g. Guyana), and traditional methods of cocaine smuggling are evolving through innovative ways of hiding, intimidating and taking bribes. We also see the multiplication and diffusion of entry points in Europe.

Traditional traffic centers in Spain, the Netherlands and Italy are complemented by ports and airports in Belgium, France and Germany, and this can only represent the tip of the iceberg, as other routes and modes of transport, such as private aviation, can simply go undetected. As a result, large amounts of cocaine seem to enter Europe at a regular pace, and law enforcement and customs officers face challenges in terms of flow limitation.



Chart no. 4. Quantities of cocaine captured during 2008-2017. Source: ANA.



A reorganization of the cocaine supply chain is also visible at the medium and retail levels, with the emergence of fragmented, freer and more horizontal structures. New technologies, such as encrypted communications applications, darknet, social media and cryptomonda, play an important role in allowing smaller groups and individual entrepreneurs to engage with a less perceptible risk of cocaine¹⁴.

Entrepreneurship in a competitive cocaine market is highlighted by innovative distribution strategies, such as cocaine exclusive call centers. These new methods, which reflect a “crunch” of cocaine trade, are clear signs of a competitive market in which vendors have to promote additional services beyond the product itself, such as fast delivery anywhere at any time¹⁵. The sale of cocaine has traditionally worked among individuals who were in the same circles, being a closed trade. We have seen a change lately, due to social media that promote relatively open cocaine and other illicit drugs, with the goal of reaching as many potential consumers as possible.

Conclusions

A first conclusion is that in Romania, because of the high cocaine price, it is consumed by only 0.1% of the consumers, and, of course, at the same time as consuming cannabis.

Cocaine traffickers do not target the drug market in Romania in order to send their cocaine; they target Turkey, Russia and, of course, the West.

The fluctuating quantities captured, implicitly the large ones in the last period, show that the organized criminal groups have found facilities for trafficking cocaine over Romania’s borders, but they are not consistent in keeping to this route. This confirms the fact that the competent authorities have also increased vigilance in the areas that criminals are trying to cross with these drugs.

¹⁴ *Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market*, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2018, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.



Trafficking at national level still remains characterized by small amounts of trafficked drugs at the street level for own consumption (small street traffic)¹⁶.

Cocaine consumption remains significant at the level of highly developed cities, as compared to the others.

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¹⁶ *National Report (Romania) on the drug situation. New developments and trends, 2018*, the National Anti-drug Agency (ANA), p. 224.



MILITARY EDUCATION – HISTORY, VISION AND INNOVATION

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Abstract: Investments in educators and trainers, the development of advanced capabilities and acquisition of new equipments can enable the Land Forces to have a “new soldier” or “soldier of the future”, a human being connected with computers, artificial intelligence, the web and the new gadgets but without forgetting the basic of military training: tactical land navigation, the usage of maps, protractors and compass.

In this context, the mission of “Mihai Viteazul” Combat Units Training School is very important for the next decades, in order to educate, train and develop military leaders and specialists, capable to understand the Operational Environment, to act the way the Army trained him/her in any military operation and be, in any circumstances, a true leader, with high moral and ethical standards.

Keywords: education, transformation, evolution, professionalism, military equipment.

Introduction

Military education has not been, until recently, in the military history of the Romanian people under the stress of the results. By preparing and training, for years, military personnel (pupils, students, enlisted and officers) in the specific fields, according to their specialties, military education came out from under the careful magnifying glass of civil society as a whole, unlike the Romanian civil part of education which, year after year, has experienced a steep decay in the media and social sphere, eventually reaching the disturbing conclusion that it does nothing but prepare “functional illiterates”.

Specific to the military field, the most difficult lesson to be transferred from the trainer / instructor and understood by learners / students is: what and mostly how should operational reality be translated into professional military education?



The role of the armed forces in any conflict is undisputed: according to plans and orders, following an operational planning process, decisions are made (in)appropriate to the situation and the military personnel execute decisive actions / operations with the desired aim of being successful. For some time, however, from one war to another, from one military campaign to another, the responsibilities of the military and the institution they represent have become much more complex, sometimes less specific to their professional training, and even more so, having to take into account a kind of contradiction in terms: “the army (the armed forces) is carrying out peace support operations”.

This aspect, however, reflects quite clearly, the new approach, far from the traditional view, of the soldiers involved in post-conflict missions, internal security and even inter-departmental activities. Somehow even the following motto so dear to the military: “Train as you fight” has lost its consistency, being transformed into a new concept of “train to be able to win peace” as a mandatory stage in coming out from a conflict as a winner.

Naturally, the consequence is embracing the idea of changing, not only for the sake of it, but for the urgent need to transform the traditional / classic military into a “modern military” adapted to the realities of the recent and future military conflicts.

The most important role in this approach lies with the educational institutions, on the training side, and where the military possesses a baggage of knowledge and skills and has certain professional experience (that “professional background”), the decisive role belongs to the non-academic institutions for life-long learning, through “Mihai Viteazul” Combat Units Training School and its subordinate training centers.

A new vision of education and military training

Let us try an exercise of imagination. Where do you think the Romanian military education and training will be in 30 years’ time, somewhere in the middle of the 21st century, maybe around 2050? Probably the same question was asked by other “visionaries” about 30 years ago at the “zero” turning point created by the events of December 1989. Thus, we



notice, in this arch over time, the beneficial evolution from the education of three decades ago (with specific teaching methods and techniques) to the current one with a multitude of tools available (computers, databases, simulation systems, etc.) which allowed the replication of real, operational military field in military education. The evolution was clear, with the analogue model being successfully replaced by the digital one, both in education and training. There were some obstacles in those times, but now they are a bit more varied and complex according to modern times: we understand how we “operate” in the powerful engagement called NATO - North Atlantic Alliance, also we have fully understood our mission as NATO ally and we have successfully accomplished our share of important goals and tasks.

However, there is a reluctance to truly “educate” the military as well as to make a change, namely to accept a set of initiatives that allow the overcoming of the current stage of military training based on arms and services/ MOS (military occupation specialty) by approaching the model of professional development based on the ability to perform in soft-power situations (before, during and after conflict) involving the JOINT, interdepartmental, multidisciplinary and multinational character of military actions / operations¹.

The Romanian military education anchored in the NATO model

This model exists and is applied with great results in the Romanian military education for the training of both the military and civilian leaders (within “Carol I” National Defense University and the National Defense College). Unfortunately, both for the military and the civilian system, military and civilian leaders are trained in order to acquire a series of sophisticated skills, according to the warfighting functions, on hierarchical levels of command and control, but which, unfortunately, can bring them in positions of being operationally “misunderstood” leaders when trying to implement their knowledge and skills within the structure they are leading. The lack of joint military education during the career courses in the training

¹ Jim Greer, *Thoughts on Military Education, Training and Leader Development in 2050*, Small Wars Journal, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art>, 2018.



institutions will lead, in perspective and in the Romanian military education system, to the appearance of “functional illiterates”, unable to understand the multilateral character of current military operations. The gravity of this phenomenon, manifested by the lack of major professional competence, will subsequently and almost inevitably affect the allocation of oversized budgets to the middle of the 21st century in order to correct certain measures that can be implemented from now on.

The “rescue” of the professional military training and, implicitly of instruction will most likely come from implementing some measures such as those listed below, that are required to be included in a military education strategy at department level:

- adopting, in the framework of tactical disciplines, of the subjects dealing with Joint Military Actions / Operations (JOINT) and combined forces / operations, starting from the basic courses of the military personnel;

- understanding and acquiring the LL - lessons learned in recent military operations, both those involving forces from the Romanian Armed Forces and from the globalized, multinationals conflicts from various theaters of operations;

- teaching relevant operational concepts and procedures for both the conflict and post-conflict stage of a military operation (urban combat, combat support, relationship with civilians and former enemies, inter-departmental conflict-related activities);

- recalibrating tasks at joint and combined forces by assembling security tasks specific to military actions / operations of stability and support;

- creating critical analytical skills to military personnel, according to their own professional experience on operational, functional and administrative areas specific to their jobs from the units of origin - the student will analyze, summarize, evaluate and understand what he/she is being taught;

- tackling the political aspects of war within the subject matters learners have to cover and understanding the complexity of civilian-military relationships in a conflict or post-conflict situation;

- increasing the quality of training in the practical domain by adopting an active state of formulating, “scanning” and exploring the



operational environment, the teacher / instructor being only the “guide” of the respective discipline;

- (re)training the instructors from a professional point of view by attending different type of courses that include multinational, combined, JOINT and, why not, inter-departmental fields;

- approaching realism in military education, by confronting the model created in the classroom (simulation room) with the real-world problems, in all their complexity, including by approaching the vision upon “How the Land Forces will be engaged in military operations in 2030/2050?”²;

- transforming the theoretical approach of the courses into a practical approach by increasing the number of hours allocated to the applicative events and distributing the human, material and financial resources adequately and conducting these drills with modern equipment (or newly acquired one), according to the military endowment and modernization plans of the Romanian Land Forces;

- turning the “failure” of creating micro-structures’ leaders - those “military managers” - into successful products, by accepting the critical shortage specific to military professionals which is the partially and distorted understanding of all the factors that make up the complex environment in which the army operates: socio-political, economical, technological, cultural, ethical and lethal (kinetic and non-kinetic).

The lack of strategic vision in the military personnel from the tactical structures has led to the emergence of a weak point in the military system: we are constantly preparing leaders / commanders / specialists who do not understand how the military structure works as a whole, which the mission and the efficiency of the military structure are and especially what the end state desired by the political legislator is. Also, it is exactly this lack of knowledge of the specific environment at strategic and operational level that leads to the wrong approach of the tactical aspect, which prevents the leader and the specialist from correctly visualizing the field and the enemy, the operational environment, to understand the limitations and constraints of the military structure to which he/she belongs.

² Conference, *Future operational environment and threats: The world in 2030 and beyond*, US Army TRADOC, 2016.



The erroneous tactical approach leads inevitably to loss of life, because the lack of critical analysis of operational aspects leads to confusion and understatement. What should we offer then in exchange, in order to educate the “modern military”? The answer is relatively simple: “the military must be a professional, effectively operational in a combined and JOINT environment”.

The complexity of military education implies the existence of specific features, which can be highlighted as follows:

- tactical professionalism and the ability to understand the operational environment - for each military, according to the hierarchical level, by adopting the tactics, techniques and procedures specific to their MOS in a combined / JOINT environment;

- technical professionalism through owning advanced knowledge in the use of information technology and new technical systems - considering the very fast evolution of the technological field and the need for urgent implementation of state-of-the-art devices and equipment;

- ethics, moral probity and respect to military deontology – the involvement in military conflicts requires abiding by the rules established by conventions and treaties and especially the recognition of the value of any human being caught in the ruthless carousel of war;

- leadership and command of the mission - leaving the comfort zone of the upper echelon (“the chief’s umbrella”), planning and executing the activity through the critical analysis at the microstructure level, as a leader involved in the problems of his/her microstructure, leader of the “fortress” and of the positive initiatives, connected to the subordinates’ problems.

Military education in the future

How should military education be in the near future?

- available: in as many forms and methods as possible, including through the use of online information resources (on-line training);

- mobile: the instructors will be available and on call to the operational units, according to their requests and priorities, the course materials being available through the INTRAMAN network or any private / secured network managed by the structures of the Ministry of Defense;



- measurable, quantifiable: by adopting clear assessment tools and criteria, as well as by establishing the necessary professional skills of beneficiaries - military structures;

- adaptable: the permanent inter-connection of the Combat Units Training School to the realism of the combined unit training and involvement in planning and conducting multinational / national exercises by transfer of know-how or through instructors' delegation;

- transferable: the complex training of trainers, which will allow in the future either the merging of courses with the same structure (competencies) or the transfer of a single course support in order to achieve standardization in teaching;

- relevant: the information transmitted must be truly new, important and innovative in relation to the daily activity of the learners from their units.

To achieve this, it is extremely important to address education through modern technologies. Of course, it can be stated as a counter-argument that technology is only a "tool", an educational tool, but if used as intended, it can lead to the desired goal: the modern professional military.

How do we do this³:

- by reducing the excessive use of "office" software packages, especially the PowerPoint program: we must emphasize that we are preparing military leaders, not corporate managers;

- by implementing "personalized" training: in order to be professional, you have to train as professionals - with dedicated instructors and microstructure commanders involved, with many rehearsals, accepting possible negative evaluations, sustained training, real and permanent quantification of achieved performance in the physical and psychological field, by accepting realistic evaluation standards adapted to the reality of the operational environment.

It is time to state clearly and bluntly that technology will not tear down walls, gates or institutions. The appearance of on-line courses does

³ Daniel S. Roper, *Regaining Tactical Overmatch: The Close Combat Lethality Task Force*, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, ILW Spotlight Magazine 18-2, 2018.

Jim Mattis, Secretary of Defence, Directive-type Memorandum 18-001, "Establishment of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF)", 16 March 2016.



not mean the end of an educational structure, but rather their progress⁴. Moreover, many components of courses or disciplines will still have a practical component: how would military personnel be without feeling the “warmth” of the armor, the smell of the fuel or the smoke of the projectile? Instead, a number of classes / sessions will require the learner's analytical and pragmatic thinking, in his / her free time, on-line, especially if he / she wants professional improvement and progress.

The use of virtual libraries, of courses available on private networks, managed by the Romanian armed forces, will increase the time allocated to performing functional duties at the unit, without giving up daily activities to the detriment of attending the course, reduce the financial burden on the learner, increase his/her need for exploration and analytical thinking, according to the operational environment in which he/she operates. Thus, progress will be certainly visible, as the field is not at all new and there are some models on the military education market (foreign language courses, specialization courses, etc.).

Instead, the practical-applicative component will have to be much more dynamic, more realistic and involving means that are much closer to the stressful effects of military conflicts. It is therefore necessary to conduct practical lessons in the form of exercises with the involvement of Opposing Forces (OPFOR) in realistic confrontations using methods and techniques that will reproduce unpleasant aspects of the modern battlefield: lack or jamming communications, lack of material goods, the supply of stocks at the minimum admissible levels, allowing the activities to be performed in survival mode, the increase of the time allocated to field exercises, using the traditional orientation instruments (the “return to tradition: map, compass and binoculars”), the more intense use of virtual simulation methods when available (General Jim Mattis, former US Defense secretary, said that the US infantrymen had to participate in at least 25 „bloody” simulated battles in order to be really ready for the first real confrontation). These issues cannot be achieved without proper endowment of military education institutions, especially the training centers and the Combat Units Training

⁴ Kris Powers, *What is web 3.0 and how might it affect education*, <https://ed4career.com/blog>, 2014.



School, with new equipment or at least with equipment with a high level of resources available for exploitation.

Understanding technological and information progress during career courses, as well as acquiring the primary elements of cyber defense and information security, will also have to go beyond the theoretical stage, and the trainee will experience his/her own emotions and experiences when he/she comes into contact with modern equipments and their specific simulators.

The implementation of modern equipment will have to take into account a series of aspects and directions that evolve from the classical, traditional area of war to its super-technological area:

- the use of fighting robots in the form of autonomous vehicles based on artificial intelligence;
- the intensive use of drones and autonomous electronic jamming systems;
- the use of autonomous combat support and logistics vehicles (able to carry equipment and rations for an infantry squad, ~ 500 kg over a 100 km distance with a range of up to 72 hours);
- improving the kinetic impact capability at tactical level by increasing the fire power of the soldier to the equivalent of a technical combat equipment;
- the use of self-directed targeting systems that identify, choose the target, calculate distance, weather characteristics, and choose the type of projectile needed to be used, with only the option of opening fire or canceling the system's decision;
- the redefinition of the concept of combat functions, by the tactical implementation of the multi-domain battle syntagm (with the use of space, land, air, cyber, and naval equipment).

That is why these high-performance machines will not have the desired success on the battlefield if the military is not familiar with their use from the early stages of the training (from the stage of training as a specialist) and will subsequently use them at the level of squad, platoon, company, in the training of the forces, at a constant pace, through training during (simulated or real) exercises and specific tactical situations.



Due to the use in the near future of robotic technology and artificial intelligence in the process of military planning and execution⁵, it will be necessary to integrate, from the basic instruction phase, to the conventional aspects of the struggle (knowledge and exploitation of traditional fighting techniques, aspects related to mission, field, weather and operational environment) and unconventional, hybrid aspects of modern technology, amid the increasing intensity of instruction, which will lead to the goal so desired by all military and political leaders: the decrease of human loss among own forces, while reducing the budget allocated to military operations.

Of course, TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) will evolve, through adaptation, due to the interference of non-conventional (hybrid) aspects in the conventional ones, as follows:

- commanders will have to reduce the decision cycle during the planning process: from days / hours to minutes / seconds, they will be in a position to “devour” (assimilate) abundant information in a much diminished timeframe;

- the tactical battle / clash will be rapid and violent, requiring critical analysis, value-adding (strengths), permanent improvement of vulnerabilities (and implicitly their acceptance), and pragmatic (critical) thinking aimed at mitigating deficiencies by making an algorithm of the activity (by applying standard operating procedures);

- the enemy / adversary will have both conventional equipment and hybrid (unconventional) one, aspect that will complicate the military operation: there will be intense jamming in the command and control system (C2), non-kinetic EW actions (electronic warfare) and cyber vulnerabilities of own systems will be identified in order to attack computer networks;

- information service and support will surrender quickly, logistics lines will be blocked and the system will become inoperable, which will affect the operability and maneuverability of structures.

⁵ ***, *Intelligent learning technologies: Applications of Artificial Intelligence to Contemporary and Emerging Educational Challenges*, AI Magazine, No 4, Volume 34, 2013.



However, classical ideas will still be successful in military operations at the tactical level, using the same issues, particularly effective in previous conflicts:

- infantry soldiers operating on foot, with the materials and equipment strictly necessary in order to carry out a fast tactical movement, on short and medium distances;
- use of mechanized maneuvering structures - IFV, APC, tank, in support of “on foot” forces;
- military operations which will involve military forces of similar organization and similar techniques, tactics and procedures with the desired end state of “breaking the front” and the quantitative overwhelming of the enemy;
- maintaining a relative balance between physical protection and mobility by adopting advanced technical solutions: reactive and active armor (including those for lightweight armor - APC, IFV);
- large-scale use of AT (anti-tank/armor) missiles serviced by both human operators (within team / platoon microstructures) and mechanized / automated equipment (manual and guided);
- the use of tanks, artillery, CAS (fighter planes and helicopters) in the urban environment for combat support of infantry.

In this respect, in order to improve the results achieved through the classic means of conducting military operations with the more intensive use of new technologies, the role of the instructor in the Combat Units Training School / training centers will evolve in the way that the JOINT, multidisciplinary and sometimes multinational model of the course will lead to its professional development, the instructor being forced to use alongside “analogical” didactic methods of memorizing, understanding, execution, analysis and evaluation, a more advanced method based on critical analysis and thinking, the “elaboration” method which is based on the originality of the course’s content and the adaptation of the course’s objectives to the battlefield realities (operational environment).

Implementing a series of the above-mentioned aspects, especially those related to the combined and JOINT character of the courses, as well as the reproduction of the battlefield reality in the practical-applicative activities, the Combat Units Training School through its subordinate training centers, will become an incubator of critical ideas and analyses of progress in military education that will have as final status the professional military personnel, the fighter and the specialist expected by the commander



of the sub-unit and valued by the unit commander, with remarkable results, desired by the structures / upper echelons.

Conclusions

Perhaps the middle of the 21st century (2050) seems to be a far-fetched and unattainable time horizon by some people today, but looking realistically towards that horizon, producing the change of the military now, perhaps a desirable shift in many of the military leadership echelons but more chosen by the execution echelons of the Romanian Armed Forces, we can lay the foundation Romanian Land Forces, perfectly adapted to the present and future geostrategic changes as well as to the technological evolution, in order not to be accused, when the fate of our country encounters troubled times, that we created “functionally illiterate military personnel”.

In this context, the mission of “Mihai Viteazul” Combat Units Training School becomes, in cooperation with other military education institutions, a crucial one to train and specialize the “modern military” of the Romanian Army Land Forces.

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